

Current History

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DECEMBER, 1975

SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1975

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Current History

DECEMBER, 1975

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How has the American withdrawal from Southeast Asia changed the political and economic status of the nations of that region? In this issue, seven articles evaluate conditions in the various Southeast Asian states. What of the United States attitude toward the area? Our introductory article points out that "The United States now subscribes to the principle of détente, and talks of economic 'interdependence,' but it has thus far proved unable to make an adequate readjustment of its outmoded strategy for Southeast Asia."

The New Power Imbalance in Southeast Asia

BY O. EDMUND CLUBB

Author, China and Russia: The Great Game

THE EARTH SHAKING developments that took place between March and May of 1975 in sometime Indochina—Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos—climaxed three decades of American involvement in revolutionary situations in East, North-east and Southeast Asia. The United States first took sides in the Chinese civil war of 1945–1949, then supported the French in their effort to restore colonial rule in Indochina, took the lead in the United Nations action in the Korean War, and, finally, fought its own Indochina War. That war ended effectively not with President Richard Nixon's announcement of January, 1973, that the United States had achieved "peace with honor in Vietnam and Southeast Asia," but with the revolutionary victories of 1975 in Cambodia, South Vietnam and Laos. The final results constituted a major defeat for the United States. It was evident that the country's rulers had been guilty of gross strategic error.

How could that be? American strategists had before them the clear record of those earlier ventures, for easy reference. In the Chinese civil war, the United States had supplied the Nationalist faction with arms, money, and liberal military advice, but the Nationalists had lost because of corrupt politics, reckless economics, basic weaknesses in the military command structure, and abominable generalship. In Korea, the United Nations effort, dominated by American troops and firepower, "won" a restoration

of the status quo ante and a truce that has lasted, with United States troops continuously on guard, for the succeeding 22 years. In the case of the eight-year-long French Indochina War, the alien French found themselves unable to win back the "hearts and minds" of Indochinese awakened to the meaning of self-determination; thus they met inglorious defeat.

What were the specific lessons of the Chinese civil war and of the French colonial war of 1946–1954 that the American strategists had misinterpreted or disregarded? First, a misguided autocracy, narrowly based, ultimately cannot stand against a dedicated, well-organized opposition in a basically revolutionary situation. Second, foreign intervention in behalf of a decadent regime cannot assure salvation, for in such circumstances that regime is further handicapped by a popular assumption that it is the creature of an alien power—a stigma that has a fatal force in these days of modern nationalism. Third, given the new Asian nationalism, occidental colonialism and imperialism in the Orient are spent forces.

In disregard of these conclusions, the United States early undertook to replace the departing French in Vietnam; it sided with Ngo Dinh Diem in his defiance of those provisions of the 1954 Geneva accords that envisaged the reunification of North and South Vietnam through political measures; and then, in 1961, it began its own military intervention, confident that where Chiang Kai-shek and the French

alike had failed to suppress revolution, it would succeed. Notoriously, it too failed. Saigon fell on April 30, 1975, to mark the end of an era. It had been almost 25 years to the day since the United States government announced (on May 8, 1950) that it was undertaking to assist the French in Indochina with military and economic aid, beginning with a grant of \$10 million. The final cost to the United States of its own Indochina War was about \$150 billion, roughly 100 times the cost of its aid to China's Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in his fight against Mao Tse-tung's revolutionary forces.¹

It is important to recall that the United States equipped South Vietnam's military establishment lavishly, in theory to enable it to perform creditably in the field. This was especially true in the "Vietnamization" phase. Ironically, Washington rushed huge quantities of advanced matériel to the Saigon regime on the eve of signature of the 1973 Paris accords, to avoid the impending restrictions on future supplies. And whereas Chiang Kai-shek lost some 80 percent of his American-supplied military equipment to the victorious Chinese Communists, to their considerable profit, South Vietnam's Premier Nguyen Van Thieu, our last Saigon "client" ruler, lost nearly all American armaments in his possession when the end came (a few boats and planes escaped).

United States Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger first put the value of the captured equipment at \$5 billion, but a Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary later reassuringly estimated that the serviceable matériel acquired by the National Liberation Front victors could be valued at only \$2 billion. Both figures would appear to be too modest. In any event, thanks to the accumulation of Soviet, Chinese, and American armaments, the two Vietnams today constitute a military power to be reckoned with in Southeast Asia. This factor enters into the postwar political equation.

Alarmist in March, 1975, in May the administration strove to buttress wavering confidence. President Gerald Ford admonished the nation to put the episode behind it, "without recrimination." And indeed the skies did not fall; no new enemies advanced immediately to challenge American power. Asked in his press conference of May 6 what were the lessons of Vietnam for the presidency, the Congress, and the American people, President Ford replied simply that, "I think the lessons of the past in Vietnam have already been learned, . . . and we should have our focus on the future."

The future was already taking shape. The de-

parture of the Americans and the termination of warfare in the Indochina peninsula meant that local problems would again be addressed and Asian diversification would be renewed. There was, first of all, the structuring of the new order in Indochina. One of the prime concerns of Hanoi and Saigon was that reunification of Vietnam foreshadowed in the Geneva accords of 1954 and the Paris agreements of 1973. Given the difficult economic and political problems facing South Vietnam, unification will probably come slowly. Meanwhile, however, both Vietnams have openly manifested their desire for friendly relations with other states. The United States, for its part, has shown no signs of relaxing its position with respect to revolutionary Vietnam; instead, thus far it has followed the pattern of the United States 1950-1972 relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC). When Hanoi indicated at the beginning of June, 1975, that it was prepared to establish normal diplomatic relations with the United States if the latter would implement the January, 1973, treaty commitment to aid in the economic reconstruction of both zones of war-torn Vietnam, the Ford administration found the attached condition "ironic": had not Hanoi violated the 1973 accords? And when the two Vietnams were put forward for separate United Nations memberships in August, the United States vetoed the measure.

American alienation is thus effective in the economic as well as in the political field. American oil companies that had invested some \$100 million in exploration for petroleum deposits in Vietnamese waters, beginning in 1973, abandoned their projects in April, 1975. The United Nations Economic and Social Council on May 7 appealed to all nations to help the peoples of Indochina in their task of reconstruction. The United States delegate voiced Washington's standing opposition to giving aid to North Vietnam, but said, in a transparent formalism, that the United States would examine "with great care and compassion" aid requests from "responsible authorities" in South Vietnam.² There is patently no present urge in Washington to reappraise the country's Vietnam policy with a view to regularization of either political or economic relations with the "enemy" regimes. That field is being left open to others.

The American relationship with Cambodia has fallen into a similar pattern. The American airlift of supplies to the Lon Nol regime was halted and the United States embassy at Phnom Penh was closed on April 12. The city fell on April 17. In mid-May, the United States proceeded to exhibit its machismo in the *Mayaguez* affair, with Washington taking an obvious pride in the forcible freeing of the captured vessel. The American action, said Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, would show the world that "there are limits beyond which the United States cannot be

¹ For a revealing brief comparison of the respective costs, in human and material terms, of the French and American Indochina wars, see "Le Cout de la Guerre," *Le Monde*, May 2, 1975.

² *The New York Times*, May 8, 1975.

pushed."³ The limits had been set at a low and dubious level indeed, at least for Cambodia. And on that same day the Commerce Department consigned both South Vietnam and Cambodia to the American limbo inhabited by North Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba, and prohibited all American exports to the two countries except those made for "special humanitarian considerations." The immediate future evidently bore little promise for the United States-Cambodian relationship.

It was only with respect to Laos that, for the moment, the United States manifested a degree of liberalism. There, the revolutionary Pathet Lao easily succeeded to dominance of the ruling royalist-Pathet Lao coalition when, in May, the rightist faction fell into disarray and the Royal Vientiane Army collapsed without fighting a battle. In Saigon, the bulletin *Free Saigon* on June 4 gave its analysis of the significance of the Laotian developments: "The grand victory of the Laotian people completes the struggle to eliminate American neocolonialism from Indochina. After a quarter of a century of fighting, the enemy has everywhere pulled down his flag."⁴ Under political pressure from Laos, the United States agreed to wind up all operations of the Agency for International Development (AID) in Laos and to transfer AID's assets to the Laotian government; and this was accomplished June 26. The 185-member AID team by report was in due course replaced by 1,500 Soviet technicians and specialists.⁵ But the United States for the time being still maintained its foothold in Laos. A senior American diplomat, one of the greatly reduced staff in Vientiane, gave the rationale: "It is better to have a small listening post here than to break off entirely as we did in Peking and have a total break in communications—a total incomprehension on both sides."⁶ That, at least, had been a lesson learned.

If the American strategy for Southeast Asia appeared to be emerging largely intact, other governments in the region, including American treaty allies, viewed the situation as fundamentally changed. The Thais, for one, were prominent and prompt in shifting their stance. After the debacle in Vietnam, with the American presence there finally ended, Thailand requested the return of air bases on Thai territory used by United States forces, and the withdrawal of all American military personnel by March, 1976. The United States proceeded roughly to recover South Vietnamese planes (of American origin) that had been flown to those Thai airfields by fleeing Saigon airmen; next, without prior consultation with

the Thai government, it dispatched United States Marines to the Utapao air base for action in the *Mayagüez* affair. Premier Kukrit Pramoj charged violation of Thai sovereignty. Secretary of State Kissinger, while expressing regret for any embarrassment that the Thai government might have been caused by the American action, nevertheless chided the Thais, as American allies, for their failure to "look with some sympathy at matters that concern the United States profoundly." The Kissinger rationale was little related to either the law or the diplomacy of the matter in point.

It was only one more sign of the times that Bangkok proceeded to redress its relations with the People's Republic of China, and on July 1 the two countries entered upon formal diplomatic relations. One of the immediate benefits derived by Peking from the action was Bangkok's severance of existing diplomatic relations with the Nationalist regime on Taiwan—an action expected to have a considerable practical effect on Thailand's 3.7 million ethnic Chinese. In return, Bangkok clearly expected the termination of Chinese support for the insurrectionists, generally Maoist, who were operating in northern Thailand. And Peking, deeply concerned with domestic matters, and aware of the bargaining power of states that stand in a "nonaligned" position between China, the Soviet Union and the United States, will probably prove to be accommodating.

ASEAN RECOGNITION OF CAMBODIA

Thailand was not alone in adjusting her foreign strategy to the new situation. The five governments of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore, extended recognition to the new government of Cambodia on April 18—the day after the Khmer Rouge occupation of Phnom Penh. On April 30, with the rebel takeover at Saigon, India and Laos recognized the revolutionary South Vietnam government. Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Sweden followed in their footsteps. The tide of change extended ever farther. In Indonesia, in anticipation of the fall of Saigon, Foreign Minister Adam Malik suggested that the establishment of an Indochinese federation under the dominant authority of North Vietnam would help the ASEAN countries "better to resist the ambitions and pressures of the great powers in the region."⁷ The fever of change affected the close United States ally, the Philippines. On June 9, in the course of a visit by President Ferdinand Marcos to Peking, the PRC and the Philippines announced the establishment of diplomatic relations between them, with Chinese in the Philippines given the option of choosing Filipino citizenship or a PRC passport. On June 11, upon his return home, President Marcos took a middle-of-the-road position:

³ *The New York Times*, May 17, 1975.

⁴ *Le Monde*, June 11, 1975.

⁵ *The New York Times*, August 29, 1975.

⁶ David A. Andelman, *The New York Times*, June 7, 1975.

⁷ "La 'theorie des dominos,'" *Le Monde*, April 24, 1975.

"We opened our windows to the socialist world, but we do not close those windows to our friends and allies."⁸

Yet there would be changes for some friends and allies. In mid-April, Marcos had announced that a study was being undertaken with regard to defense arrangements with the United States, including provisions for the American use of the Subic Bay Naval Base and the Clark Air Base. Addressing a conference of economists and financial experts from Southeast Asian countries, in early July, Marcos indicated that the Philippines was now ready to undertake formal negotiations with the United States regarding the matter. He then adumbrated the proposed change as regards the bases. "We want to assume control of all those bases and put them to productive economic as well as military use," he said. "[We have] never depended on foreign troops to fight our battles; there remains no reason why foreign troops should remain on our soil."⁹ A report from Washington shortly afterward indicated that the United States was prepared to meet the Filipino request for talks on the subject, and that full-scale negotiations would begin in late summer or early fall.¹⁰

In sum and substance, the American system of military alliances in Southeast Asia has come apart. Quasi-formal confirmation of the collapse of the alliance network is discovered by reference to the conditions of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the handiwork of United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. France had withdrawn from participation in SEATO's military activities in 1967 and stopped contributing to the organization's finances as of the beginning of 1974. Pakistan withdrew from membership in November, 1972. In the course of a visit to the Philippines by Premier Kukrit of Thailand, President Marcos announced on July 24 that the Philippine and Thai governments were in agreement that there should be a progressive disappearance of SEATO. In full appreciation of the handwriting on the wall, foreign ministers of the SEATO council met behind closed doors in the United States U.N. Mission in New York on September 24 and agreed that, given the "new realities of the region," the organization should be phased out. SEATO's secretary general, Sunthorn Hongladaron of Thailand, was directed to prepare a plan for accomplishing that end "in an orderly and systematic manner." From its inception in 1954, SEATO had never functioned as a body to support the American intervention in Indochina.

Premier Kukrit and President Marcos had also agreed in July that, with the disappearance of SEATO, there should be a strengthening of ASEAN. Premier Kukrit observed that he perceived no objection to the participation of the region's Communist countries in ASEAN; "We hope," he said, "to invite them some day in order to persuade them."¹¹ The process of persuasion will probably not be too difficult. The "Communist" victories in Indochina do not give the dominant position in Southeast Asia to either the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China in place of the United States. The Vietnams are pro-Soviet; Cambodia is pro-Chinese; but in the era now dawning they have opted for "non-alignment," and so has North Korea. They are thus divorced both from the subordination and dangers that came to Indochina with American guardianship, and from the "commitments" and political risks involved in the taking of sides in the Sino-Soviet conflict. In any event, they now have less urgent need than before of either Soviet or Chinese aid—and the character of the need has changed.

This situation is related to a larger, critical circumstance: although old rivalries persist and new conflicts will doubtless emerge in the region, the countries of Southeast Asia are showing themselves prepared to downgrade political differences among themselves in favor of a regional grouping designed to promote the benefits of all participants—both in mutual relationships and in relation to the outside world. Given contemporary patterns, members of the Southeast Asian group of states will probably cooperate with increasing effectiveness in order to strengthen their joint bargaining power vis-à-vis the major powers, socialist and capitalist. A larger and more active ASEAN is in the making; the Bandung Conference of 1955 is beginning to bear fruits.

"The old order changeth. . . ." Has the American grand strategy for Southeast Asia changed accordingly? Speaking at Milwaukee on July 14—a good revolutionary holiday—Henry Kissinger proclaimed that "The rigidities of the cold war period have fragmented." Demonstrably they have not quite, as far as the United States is concerned. The antagonisms manifested by Washington with respect to

(Continued on page 242)

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⁸ *The New York Times*, June 12, 1975.

⁹ *The New York Times*, July 8, 1975.

¹⁰ *The New York Times*, July 12, 1975.

¹¹ *Le Monde*, July 27-28, 1975.

"... some seven months after the fall of Saigon there is little apparent change in the foreign policies of Malaysia and Singapore." As this author sees it, "China has not made any obvious moves to capitalize on Communist victories in Indochina, and each conquering force in the peninsula seems to be working out its problems in its own historical and cultural idiom."

Malaysia and Singapore: Facing New Realities?

BY ROBERT O. TILMAN

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GEOGRAPHY HAS IMPOSED a great burden on the states of Malaysia and Singapore. The Malay Peninsula provides the eastern bank of the Straits of Malacca, a waterway of less than ten miles width at its narrowest point and one of the great international maritime passageways of the world. The Malacca Straits sit astride an ocean highway that moves petroleum from the Arabian Gulf to fuel the Japanese industrial machine. Westward-bound freighters hauling Japanese manufactured goods for South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe pass eastward-bound freighters transporting European goods bound for Singapore, Indonesia, China and Japan. If Malacca is to be bypassed, deep-draught vessels must add another 1,200 to 1,500 miles to their voyage as they pass through the Straits of Lombok and the Makassar Straits in Indonesia. Beyond Lombok there are many alternatives, but all reasonable passageways are within Indonesian territorial waters, and each adds many expensive miles to already high freight charges.

Other important geographic factors include Singapore's excellent deepwater and natural harbor facilities, the island's strategic location at the southeastern mouth of the Malacca Straits, and the natural resources of the area. Malaysia produces about half the world's supply of natural rubber and about the same proportion of its tin. The Sultanate of Brunei, on the west coast of Borneo, has long been a modest but highly profitable producer of oil; and newly drilled wells off the coast of the eastern Malaysian state of Sabah have also gone into production. In addition to other offshore drillings now under way, these wells should cause petroleum to account for some 35 percent of Malaysia's exports in 1975, and this may rise to 50 percent by the end of 1976. Moreover, this

low-sulphur-content oil, which is less polluting because of its clean-burning properties, is very attractive as an additive to Arabian Gulf oil, particularly for the Japanese. In all of this, Singapore has not been neglected even though as yet she has not found any oil reserves within her own waters. However, Singapore has become a hub for oil exploration, ship repairing, bunkering, and refining, and thus she continues to enjoy an oil boom of her own. Singapore is only some 225 square miles in area, and Malaysia is only slightly larger than the American state of New Mexico; but it is apparent that size alone is not an adequate measure of the international significance of the two countries.

Singapore and Malaysia entered the postwar era as separate entities, and, after a two-year courtship, a less than two-year marriage, and an abrupt divorce, they are again separate. The Federation of Malaysia was created in September, 1963, out of the old Federation of Malaya (which had been given its independence from Great Britain in 1957), the Bornean states of Sabah and Sarawak (at the time British Crown Colonies), and the island city-state of Singapore (which, despite its Crown Colony status, enjoyed considerable internal autonomy after 1955). The brief marriage of Singapore to Malaysia was stormy, and when the two parted company on August 9, 1965, few tears were shed. Since 1965, relations have improved considerably, and while the two states could not be described as being on intimate terms, at least there is now a significant degree of cooperation between them.

Malaysia is now governed by a broad coalition of Malay-dominated parties known collectively as the Barisan Nasional (National Front). In a country

where race permeates almost all aspects of life,¹ it is not surprising that political parties have racially identifiable followings. Prior to the emergence of the National Front, which was created by the government largely in response to the upheavals of 1969, the ruling coalition had been the Malaysian Alliance. The Alliance was ostensibly a pan-racial coalition of racially based parties, but over the years the influence of the Chinese had waned as that of the Malays had waxed. By the time of the bloody Kuala Lumpur riots of May, 1969, and the ensuing two-year hiatus of extra-constitutional rule, the voice of the Chinese constituents was faint, and the Chinese politicians were largely ineffectual.

Malaya had been created in 1957 as an intentionally centralized federation, and the Malaysia scheme of 1963, while giving greater power to the new states, retained the federal structure. The federal trappings remained intact (elected state assemblies with chief ministers responsible to them, state governors or sultans, an upper federal house with state representation, and so on), but the trend has been for the center to augment its powers at the expense of the states. Only Sabah, on the northern tip of the island of Borneo, has retained significant autonomy, and this is chiefly because of its resource base (timber and more recently oil) and the autocratic rule of the 57-year-old self-educated Chief Minister, Tun Mustapha bin Dato Harun, once a houseboy in the home of the British colonial governor. Mustapha, who has spent much time abroad in recent years, has now been challenged at home by a former political foe, who had retired from active politics once Mustapha had emerged on top. At present, however, it seems probable that the Chief Minister will weather the storm and continue to guide Sabah. Despite the Sabah exception, significant developments in Malaysian politics take place chiefly in Kuala Lumpur, the federal capital, not in the 13 constituent federal units extending from southern Thailand to Indonesia.

Singapore has frequently found herself excluded from Malaysian political organizations, and over time she has developed her own political styles, formats, and dynamics. Singapore was originally the dominant colony of the three-territory Straits Settlements, which was ruled directly by the British in contrast to their "indirect rule" over most of the peninsula—the Federated Malay States (FMS) and the Unfederated Malay States (UMS). Singapore was similarly ex-

cluded from the short-lived Malayan Union scheme (1946–1948) and from the Federation of Malaya (1948–1963). Thus, when Singapore left the Federation of Malaysia in 1965, it was more in the nature of a return to tradition than a departure from it.

When Singapore gained much of her internal autonomy in 1959, the party that assumed control was the People's Action Party (PAP). Today its image and composition have changed considerably, but the PAP continues to guide Singapore with a firm hand. In 1959, the PAP was a shaky coalition of English- and Chinese-educated elites of almost all political persuasions from Communists to Fabian Socialists. Over time, however, the PAP lost its support on the left while gaining strength at the center and on the right, and today the party is dominated by an English-educated elite whose commitment to socialism is tempered considerably by the realities of the Singapore economy.

At the top of the party and government structures sits Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, a Cambridge-educated lawyer with unusual cerebral prowess, an uncanny knack for survival, and a prodigious capacity for work. Such a man is obviously not without his critics (though the most outspoken of these are rarely in evidence for long), and there is a disoriented and ineffective opposition. However, supporters and critics alike are generally impressed by the strides made by the minuscule city-state, and much of the credit for the current prosperity and stability of Singapore must go to Lee and the top echelon of the PAP.

The period 1957–1970 might conveniently be called the Tunku Abdul Rahman era after the reigning Prime Minister; "the Tunku," as he is still affectionately known, dominated the foreign policy arena for more than a decade before retiring in August, 1970. The Tunku frequently spoke of Malaya's neutrality in the cold war and her role as a broker between ex-colonial powers and the former colonies. But in fact the Tunku's Malaya (and later Malaysia) steered a foreign policy course close to the shores of her former colonial master and her ideological ally, the United States. Among many third world countries, Malaya was regarded as a "soft" anti-colonial, though the image was probably something less than accurate.² Under the Tunku's guidance, Malaya was a consistent supporter of the United States position in Vietnam. The Tunku promptly cabled his support for United States President Lyndon Johnson's position after the Gulf of Tonkin incident; the Prime Minister was the recipient of the Grand Cross of the National Order of Vietnam; and, welcoming President Johnson to Kuala Lumpur in 1966, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (Head of State) lauded the "vital role" the United States was playing, "despite the corrosive campaign of hate and lies, . . . to defend South Viet-

¹ Malays and other natives ("*bumiputeras*"—or "sons of the soil," as the indigenous people are known) comprise 47 percent of the population by official tabulation. The ethnic Chinese population is second largest in percentage (34 percent) and one of the largest in numbers in Southeast Asia. The term "indigenous" must be employed with caution since some of the *bumiputeras* arrived after some of the Chinese.

² Robert O. Tilman, *Malaysian Foreign Policy* (McLean, Va.: Research Analysis Corporation, 1969), pp. 8–10.

nam for peace in Asia."³ It also took the Tunku's Malaya and Malaysia a decade to recognize the U.S.S.R. (an agreement to exchange ambassadors was announced on June 15, 1967), and under the Tunku even modest contacts with the People's Republic of China were out of the question.

The Tunku faced the Kuala Lumpur riots of May 13, 1969, in a weakened position. His charisma had faded over the years, in part because his dreamchild, Malaysia, seemed to be creating as many problems as she solved. The Tunku, who was known popularly during the heady days of 1961–1963 as Bapak (Father) Malaysia, could not avoid identification with such upheavals as the "confrontation" with Indonesia, the revolt in Brunei, a diplomatic rupture with the Philippines, dissatisfaction in Sarawak, and increasingly bitter disputes with the new federal state of Singapore. While the Tunku retained his position as Prime Minister throughout most of the emergency of 1969–1971, he was largely eclipsed by the head of the National Operations Council (the extra-constitutional body that ruled during the emergency) and his Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak. The Tunku had always made it clear that Razak was the heir-apparent, and when he stepped down in August, 1970, it was Razak whom the Yang di-Pertuan Agong named as the Tunku's successor.

With the appointment of Razak, Malaysian foreign policy shifted noticeably from right to center, although the shift was marked more by continuity than discontinuity, consistent with the style and character of Malaysian politics. Tun Razak almost immediately reversed the Malaysian position on the seating of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the United Nations. He visited East Europe, where he negotiated several trade agreements and secured Malaysia's first technical cooperation arrangement with a Communist state. Tun Razak unveiled a neutralization scheme for Southeast Asia, before a conference in Kuala

Lumpur of the foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN, which is composed of Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore). With varying degrees of enthusiasm, the plan was adopted as the "Kuala Lumpur declaration" in the conference's final communiqué on November 26, 1971. By 1973, in pursuit of her averred policy of neutrality, Malaysia had established diplomatic relations with a number of Communist states, including North Korea and North Vietnam, but she still had not recognized the People's Republic of China.

Indirect contacts with the PRC had begun almost as soon as Tun Razak became Prime Minister. China's generous offer of aid for Malaysian flood victims in February, 1971, was warmly received, and an unofficial Malaysian trade delegation to China in May of the same year reported a hospitable reception. Sports and cultural exchanges followed. Razak met with the PRC ambassador to Austria while on a European tour in September, 1972, and Malaysia officially invited PRC diplomats in London to attend their National Day celebrations in Kuala Lumpur in August. Tan Sri Raja Mohar, a special adviser to Prime Minister Razak, visited China in November amid much speculation that Malaysia was moving determinedly toward recognition of the PRC.⁴ The establishment of diplomatic relations seemed inevitable, but some of Malaysia's neighbors, particularly Indonesia and Singapore, were wary, and in deference to their feelings Razak proceeded with considerable caution. Finally, in May, 1974, Razak visited China and recognition was announced in a joint communiqué issued from Peking on May 31, 1974.⁵

Because Malaysia was the first non-Communist Southeast Asian country to recognize China, the Sino-Malaysian agreement was to become the model for later joint communiqués. In general, it described the action taken (recognition), offered a rationale for it (a differing political situation and the interests of the two peoples), recognized existing differences between the two countries, enunciated principles of noninterference despite these differences, put Taiwan in its place (as an integral part of China,) and resolved the domestic Chinese problem by recognizing as Malaysians all who had opted for local citizenry and all who might do so in the future (while urging those who remained Chinese to be law-abiding aliens).

Presumably Malaysia hoped to blunt any renascent Chinese nationalism among her own law-abiding Chinese population, and to undermine the anti-government activities of the predominantly Chinese guerrillas still operating within Malaysia and on her northern border with Thailand. However, the Communists in the jungles reacted unfavorably, and several incidents, the earliest ones obviously timed to undermine Razak's visit to China, caused some of the heaviest losses of property and lives in recent years in Malaysia.⁶

³ Welcome by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, Subang Airport, Kuala Lumpur, October 30, 1966, Malaysian Information Service press release, November 1, 1966.

⁴ Stephen Chee, "Malaysia and Singapore: Separate Identities, Different Priorities," *Asian Survey*, vol. 13, no. 2 (February, 1973), pp. 156–57.

⁵ The English text consulted here was published in *Peking Review*, no. 23 (June 7, 1974), p. 8.

⁶ On May 23, 1974, Communist terrorists destroyed earth-moving equipment valued at about M\$10 million (about US\$4 million) on the new East-West Highway near Grik in northern Perak. The inspector general of police was assassinated in Kuala Lumpur two weeks later. The wife of a Japanese engineer and her Malay driver were killed by terrorists in December at the site of the Temongor Dam project in Perak. The Tokyo offices of the dam-construction firm were also bombed, and harassment at the site continued. Work had to be suspended for two months while security around the project was improved, but when workers returned to their jobs in early March, 1975, there was still considerable apprehension, and, in fact, another attack on the workers occurred the following month.

It is probable that Malaysia hoped the new government-to-government ties with China would silence Radio Suara Revolusi Malaya (the Voice of the Malaysian Revolution), a Communist station that since November, 1969, has beamed virulent anti-government propaganda in Mandarin toward Malaysia's Chinese population. Since it is probable that the station is located on Chinese soil, it may have seemed logical to assume that its broadcasts would terminate with the establishment of Sino-Malaysian ties. However, China is a country that clearly distinguishes between government-to-government relations and relations among fraternal Communist parties; instead of muting the attacks on the "Razak clique," the rhetoric escalated in intensity after May, 1974.

Thus, as the end of the American involvement on the Asian mainland drew near, Malaysia found herself in a good position to make the necessary adjustments. Razak was recognized as the architect and chief spokesman of Southeast Asian neutralization; Malaysia enjoyed official ties with the major Communist states of the world, and was alone in non-Communist Southeast Asia in forging ties with China; and all of this had been accomplished without imposing serious strains on Malaysia's traditionally friendly relationship with the West, the Commonwealth, and her ASEAN neighbors.⁷

SINGAPORE'S FOREIGN POLICY, 1965-1975

To a great extent, Singapore's foreign policy since 1965 has been forged by two men, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam, and, of the two, the Prime Minister, not unexpectedly, has tended to have the dominant voice. A small island-nation of some 2 million population caught in the crosscurrents of international politics is not in a position to create a totally independent foreign policy. The fact that Lee and Rajaratnam have been able to demonstrate any independence at all is a remarkable tribute to the two men, their associates, and the vitality of the people of Singapore. Despite the lim-

itations, a clearly discernible strategy for survival has emerged, and thus far it seems to have worked well.⁸

In the view of its leaders, Singapore's chances of survival will be enhanced if several basic internal and international conditions are met. At home Singapore must be "rugged," stable, and thriving.⁹ The states surrounding Singapore in Southeast Asia will hopefully be stable and will not be subject to the total domination of any one of the superpowers. Hopefully, there will be a constellation of competing major powers, each of whom regards Singapore as a prize that must not be dominated by one of the others. In other words, if Singapore is prosperous and attractive, if Singapore's neighbors can retain enough internal cohesion to avoid big-power intervention, and if the three superpowers each retain an interest and a presence in Southeast Asia—then Singapore has a fair chance to formulate and execute her own foreign policy.

This strategy for survival must be kept in mind if one is to understand some apparent contradictions in Singapore's foreign policy. On many occasions Lee has chided Americans for their lack of will in Indochina. But he also declined to consider substituting American for British military forces after the United Kingdom announced in 1968 that the "rundown" in Singapore would be completed by late 1971. Lee has staunchly and repeatedly denied that he accepts any "domino theory," but in many statements he has described a series of events that suggest falling dominoes. In fact, Lee was worried about American consistency and constancy in Indochina, because his strategy for survival depended on American willingness to remain involved in Southeast Asia rather than withdrawing to "fortress America." At the same time, Lee needed a United States that would not respond to Southeast Asian threats with a military overkill that would threaten the delicate standoff so crucial to Singapore's survival. In a sense (and certainly not in his own words), Lee seems to have been telling the United States that "for better or worse you got yourself into Indochina, and now how you get out is crucial to our survival. If you try for quick victory the other superpowers will be forced to react and the standoff will be broken. If you default, your credibility as a major force in the standoff equation will be jeopardized, and the less stable states on the rim of China will have no choice but to find other alternatives." Thus, in Lee's thinking, there seems to have been something of a subtle and complex domino theory in operation; the United States was capable of toppling the first domino by doing either too little or too much.

As the inevitable demise of anti-Communist Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam approached in 1975, Singapore seemed to be faced with new and unpleasant realities. A reassessment of the situation was

⁷ Another positive factor was Malaysia's ability to avoid the oil embargo. Razak's task was made much easier, of course, by the fact that Malaysia is a predominantly Muslim country.

⁸ Much of this section has been adapted from an earlier essay on the subject by the author. See "Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines," in Wayne Wilcox et al., *Asia and the International System* (Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers, 1972), pp. 212-18.

⁹ The "rugged society" is an important element in the formulation. In Lee's view, the people of Singapore must be able to live and prosper under conditions of continuing stress and uncertainty. It is no accident that in much of Lee's description, Singapore's situation resembles that of Israel. The Prime Minister has stated publicly that after reviewing the situations of many small nations Singapore's leaders have concluded that their small state best fits the Israeli model. (Prime Minister Lee's address to the Council of the Socialist International, Zurich, October, 1967.)

imperative, for the conditions vital to Singapore's strategy for survival seemed to have changed.

FACING "NEW" REALITIES

At midnight on April 17, 1975, the Cambodian embassy in Bangkok announced that fighting would cease, and the Khmer insurgents would be permitted to take over the country. Thirteen days later, amid the chaos of looting and the pandemonium of desperate Vietnamese making last-ditch efforts to get out, the last American helicopter lifted from the roof of the American embassy in Saigon. Laos, with less political structure, crumbled less dramatically, but when the American Chargé, Christian Chapman, signed an agreement on May 27 terminating the United States AID (Agency for International Development) program by June 30, it was apparent that the last act was ending. The third Indochina war, and the most costly United States anti-Communist intervention, had come to a close.

Reactions in non-Communist Southeast Asia to the United States defeat were swift. Thailand had already secured an agreement for the withdrawal of all American forces by June, 1976, and the flight of many American-purchased South Vietnamese aircraft from Saigon to Utapao airbase in Thailand placed new strains on Thai-American relations. The *Mayagüez* incident in May, 1975,* and its aftereffects constituted the low point in United States relations with its previously staunch Thai ally because the recovery operation had been launched from Thai soil. In addition, the presence of vast numbers of Vietnamese refugees searching for safety throughout Southeast Asia was a constant embarrassment. Amid the confusion, President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, in sometimes shrill tones, called for a reassessment of the United States role in the Philippines and hinted darkly that the American naval base at Subic Bay and the Clark Air Base should probably be closed.

Singapore had never been involved in the United States venture in Indochina (except briefly as an American troop vacation center) and Malaysia had long since cut her limited commitment to the American war effort. Thus the discomfort and the frustra-

tions were less verbal in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore than in Bangkok and Manila. However, no capital could escape the political fallout. There was a general fear that the disillusionment stemming from the American defeat would produce a neo-isolationist reaction at home, and that the United States (in particular the American Congress and the American voters) might no longer have any interest in meeting its Asian commitments. Beyond these broad concerns, there were fears about the tons of weaponry that the Americans had left behind in Indochina. Some of this was probably too sophisticated to be effective. Nonetheless, as Lee Kuan Yew said publicly shortly after the fall of Saigon, countless thousands of small arms made available by the departing Americans could be used to create considerable mischief throughout Southeast Asia.¹⁰ And, despite her new ties with the People's Republic of China and other Communist states, Malaysia was expecting increased guerrilla activity "as a consequence of developments in Indochina. . . ." While Razak took pains not to lay the blame on a "North Vietnamese expansionist policy" and was careful not to be overly critical of China, it was apparent that he feared a spillover effect on Malaysia's Communist movement in the countryside as the Vietnamese war ground to a halt.¹¹

Lee and Razak had good reasons to be concerned. Malaysia's ties with Peking seemed to have had painfully little impact on her Communist guerrillas, and the clandestine Communist radio station was apparently encouraged to escalate its level of rhetoric. In fact, the distinction that seems to persist in Peking between government-to-government and party-to-party relations may give any leader reason to pause and reflect when his country is dealing with a one-party state like China. While the PRC could assure Malaysia that it would not "export subversion," the Chinese Communist party had reportedly hailed the burning of a Kuala Lumpur police station as a "great success."¹² In April, 1975, on the occasion of the forty-fifth anniversary of the outlawed Malayan Communist party, the Chinese Communist party sent a congratulatory note to the fraternal party, and the Malayan Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Chinese ambassador in Kuala Lumpur that the note "was contrary to the assurance of Chairman Mao . . . that the terrorists . . . were entirely our internal affair. . . ."¹³ While one must distinguish pronouncements from

(Continued on page 242)

* When Cambodian troops seized a U.S. merchant ship, the *Mayagüez*, the United States forcibly recovered the ship and the crew.

¹⁰ Singapore Domestic Service, 1330 GMT, May 3, 1975.

¹¹ Tun Abdul Razak (speaking to a meeting of military commanders in Kuala Lumpur less than two weeks before the fall of Saigon), Jakarta Domestic Service, 1200 GMT, April 17, 1975.

¹² The congratulatory note was duly reported by the semi-official New China News Agency, but its existence was later denied by the Chinese ambassador to Kuala Lumpur after the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had protested. AFP, 1217 GMT, May 4, 1975.

¹³ *New Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur), June 23, 1975, p. 1.

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"Among Asians, Khmer desires for peace and respect have been recognized and reciprocated."

Consolidating the Cambodian Revolution

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THE YEAR 1975 brought historic changes to Cambodian politics and society. Five years of civil and foreign-inspired war ended abruptly in April as liberation forces, nominally led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, entered the Khmer capital of Phnom Penh. They met no resistance. To the contrary, the city's population ran into the streets to greet and to cheer the guerrillas. Even soldiers wearing the uniform of the defeated army joined reunions in the streets. Whether or not they understood or supported the socialist cause, nearly all these Cambodians knew that the socialist victory meant peace for the country and the opportunity to reclaim battlefields for the production of food.

¹ "Kampuchea" is the Khmer language name for the country of the Khmer people. The French "Cambodge" and the English "Cambodia" are colonial derivations. The revolutionaries use only the national name.

² Interview of Vice Premier Ieng Sary in *Newsweek*, September 8, 1975.

³ See this writer's "Cambodia: Model of the Nixon Doctrine," *Current History*, December, 1973.

⁴ *Le Monde*, 5 février, 1975.

⁵ There were never any serious efforts to negotiate a settlement to the Cambodian war. The United States persistently denied the revolutionaries' prior condition that their government, Prince Sihanouk's, be dealt with as a government, not as an opposition party or a provisional revolutionary government within Lon Nol's regime. Juridically speaking, the position of the revolutionaries rested on the illegality of the parliamentary vote deposing Sihanouk in 1970. Under these circumstances, occasional United States pressure on the Lon Nol group to seek negotiation was only a clever way to prevent negotiations while appearing conciliatory.

A critical opportunity for a negotiated settlement was missed in January, 1973, when President Richard Nixon and United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger deliberately avoided direct discussions with Prince Sihanouk. They chose instead to begin the daily saturation bombings in support of Lon Nol. For details, see the testimonies and prepared statements of D. Gareth Porter and Laura Summers in hearings on S. 1443 before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 4, 1973. During the costly and frustrating battle of Phnom Penh, Prince Sihanouk called Dr. Kissinger "intelligent but intellectually dishonest." *The Guardian* (Manchester), March 5, 1975.

These spontaneous celebrations were short-lived. Within hours of entering the city on April 17, the revolutionaries ordered a general evacuation. Every man, woman and child, including hospital patients and thousands of half-starved refugees (a population numbering between 2 million and 3 million people), walked to food distribution centers in the countryside. The haste with which this was done and the suffering it created in the short term appeared unavoidable to the People's Armed Forces for National Liberation of Kampuchea (PAFNLK).¹ At the time, there were rumors that the Americans intended to bomb the city. Later, Ieng Sary, a Vice Premier in the revolutionary government, explained that the evacuation was necessary because the liberation army did not have the means to import tons of food to the city as the Americans had done. If food could not be brought to the people, then the population had to go to the countryside to obtain it and to produce it.²

As for the rumors of American attacks, Ieng Sary further explained that the revolutionaries had an American intelligence document outlining specific sabotage operations once the city was occupied. The Khmers could not be sure whether the document contained authentic plans or speculative, contingency proposals. What was certain was the tenacious and frequently violent insistence of American governments on controlling the course of developments in Khmer politics. Cambodian territory, Khmer society and the revolutionary movement were the principal victims of the ill-conceived and ill-fated Nixon Doctrine.³ Subsequently, the administration of United States President Gerald Ford attempted to prolong the lost war. White House emergency funds paid for an airlift of food and military supplies into Cambodian Premier Lon Nol's last major positions. The supplies included oxygen-absorbing cluster bomb units (CBU-55) that are indiscriminate in their destruction.⁴ The Ford administration also requested additional military aid for Lon Nol under the pretence of searching for a negotiated settlement.⁵

In the end, the legacy of United States policies—600,000 killed, prolonged suffering and incidental charity—is painful for Americans and for Khmers. When American diplomats hastily evacuated Phnom Penh on April 12, they feared their own Khmer embassy guards. For Khmers who survived, the awesome task was to transform the accumulated bitterness and suffering into an impetus for socioeconomic reconstruction of the country, while at the same time normalizing the country's foreign relations to prevent any further harmful intervention. Despite great difficulties, the revolutionary government is making progress in both domains.

POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION

Evacuees from Phnom Penh and most of Kampuchea's rural population have been organized into production teams called solidarity groups. These are supervised by PAFNLK cadres who make a point of doing their share of the group's work. The groups vary in size according to project. Some village-level teams organized during the war remain small and intimate, including 10 to 25 people; but most new groups are larger, with 100 or more people. Many new teams are also mobile, because they are responsible for the reconstruction of the country's roads and bridges, and the Poipet-Phnom Penh railway. River ports, water routes, dams and canals are also being cleared, dredged, rebuilt or extended. In areas where American bombing destroyed whole villages or numerous dwellings, production teams are building houses. Medical teams, including at least one team practicing acupuncture in Kampong Chhnang province, are manufacturing drugs and vitamin supplements from local herbs. Most solidarity groups are engaged in agricultural work, however, for in the absence of foreign imports or even a currency of exchange, the immediate and long-term economic well-being of Kampuchea's population of 7 million depends on caloric energy generation and allocation. To this end, the problems confronting Khmer society go far beyond the destruction and dislocation of the recent fighting.

Before the war, Cambodia's per hectare rice yield was considerably lower than that of her Southeast Asian neighbors. Centuries of intensive cultivation of the land, combined with lack of modernization, left Khmer farmers at the mercy of nature, and restricted rice production to one crop per monsoon year in most regions. Very few provinces attained average yields of one ton per hectare. Developmental neglect in conjunction with population increases and

expanding consumer demand for expensive imported goods led Cambodia on the road to food deficiency before the war began in 1970. Instability and lag in the agrarian sector were fundamental causes of economic instability in the Sihanouk era, but government attempts at reforms were foiled by the structure of land ownership and rural credit.

During the war, the revolutionaries organized village committees in an effort to increase individual productivity as well as total production. Improved rice strains came from China, and small amounts of fertilizer, possibly captured stocks, were applied to selected areas. Engineers directed the construction of new irrigation works. Reports of double-cropping and larger yields were broadcast by the resistance radio station as early as 1972. New seeds, better water control, fertilizer and more efficient local organization became as valuable as firearms in the politics of the war. As Phnom Penh was militarily isolated and then cut off from land and water supply routes, the liberation forces invited the city's population to slip through the "defense" perimeter to obtain food and security. In 1973, Khmers loyal to the resistance believed the major purpose of Nixon's six-month bombing campaign was to destroy the emerging productive potential and the social security of the liberated zone, but this could not be discussed by any party to the war at the time. For Prince Sihanouk's Royal Government of National Union (RGNU) to have made the charge would have begged the question of the effectiveness of the bombing. The American government could never admit to bombing civilian targets or deliberately trying to create starvation; the Lon Nol regime always insisted that the PAFNLK and civilians in the liberated zone had less food than the residents of Phnom Penh. This alarming suggestion combined with heavy bombing and artillery fire in rural areas deterred many people from voting with their feet until the day of liberation. Nevertheless, the proof of some agrarian accomplishment in the liberated zone came in the summer of 1974, when the RGNU exported 50,000 tons of rice to South Vietnam in payment for arms required for a major offensive on Phnom Penh.

Because of the high cost of the war and in spite of increased rural productivity, the prospect of nourishing an additional 3 million people in the months immediately following victory must have been daunting. Indeed, refugee reports confirm that food allowances in the solidarity groups are small; but there is little evidence of the famine conditions so frequently mentioned in the American press.⁶ These American reports, even those claiming to be based on intelligence analyses, ignore the changes in agricultural technology made during the war as well as current efforts to diversify food production through the cultivation of rice substitutes. Emphasis on the increased culti-

⁶ Some of these speculations about famine based on anonymous "intelligence sources" appear in the "Periscope" section of *Newsweek*, July 21, 1975, and September 15, 1975. See also the news report in *Newsweek's* September 22, 1975, issue.

vation of tapioca, sweet potatoes, corn, beans and bananas, for example, is consistent with altered consumption patterns in the late 1960's, when high rice prices on the black market in Vietnam encouraged Khmer farmers to limit their personal consumption of their most valuable product. The end of war also means greater security for fishing and livestock industries. National prospects for the December-January rice harvest remain good, even though drought conditions threaten the yield in small areas of the country. It is important to remember, however, that even a mediocre rice harvest would not necessarily lead to famine. Gross agricultural production and efficiency in food distribution are more important factors than they have been in the past.

In contrast to the uncertainties in agriculture, Cambodia's reconstruction efforts in the industrial sector can already be called successful. By August and September, more than 70 factories were back in production, including a textile factory, a power station, waterworks, a motor-vehicle tire works, a soap factory and a papermill in Phnom Penh. Outside the capital, the power station, water tower and harbor at Sihanoukville and the textile mill and hemp sack factory in Battambang are operating. Two dry cell battery factories near Phnom Penh, rapidly repaired in May, were able to reopen only because raw materials were found in stock. Many plants were pilaged or sabotaged in the final days of the war and are short of certain materials. Several plants, including the dry cell battery factories, gradually increased production over the summer as materials or substitutes were located. Most of the work force in the heavy industries are peasant-soldiers receiving on-the-job-training. Now, most of the materials being processed are locally produced. These include cotton and silk fibers as well as rubber latex. Hydroelectric power is the main source of energy in large plants. Oil, gasoline and kerosene fuels are scarce, but some supplies are being purchased regularly in markets on the Thai border.

As factories reopen and as sowing ends in the countryside, Phnom Penh is being slowly repopulated. An estimated 100,000 people, approximately one-sixth of the capital's normal prewar population, lived there in September. Continuing population movements in the interim between rice transplanting and harvesting are to be expected, but the efficiency with which people are being shifted from reconstruction projects or permanently resettled cannot yet be determined. Life is without doubt confusing and arduous in many regions of the country, but current hardships are probably less than those endured during the war. It is a mistake to interpret postwar social disorganization or confusion as nascent opposition to the revolution. Thus far, few Khmers have left the country, and many of those who have left are former officers

from Lon Nol's army or former civil servants who fear prosecution for wartime activities. No war crimes trials have, in fact, come to light, probably because of an RGNU decision to avoid deepening internal sociopolitical conflicts and bitterness in a time of reconstruction.

CAMBODIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

On the first day of the resumption of Radio Phnom Penh transmissions, Vice Premier and Minister of Defense Khieu Samphan announced that internal security and reconstruction were the government's first priorities. Next highest priority was attached to an international policy of nonalignment. The announcement was not surprising. The National United Front of Kampuchea, the political arm of the RGNU, had committed itself to such a foreign policy in its political program of May, 1970. Reiteration was nonetheless necessary because of international speculation about the extent of cooperation between Prince Sihanouk and the revolutionaries led by Khieu Samphan. By confirming that the revolutionaries intend to play an active role in the community of nonaligned third world states, Khieu Samphan was saying that the basis for continuing cooperation between the Prince and the revolutionaries remains firm. The alliance rests upon mutual appreciation of the necessity for a self-sustaining foreign policy of nonalignment.

Nonalignment is the key to Prince Sihanouk's successful political career. The concept reflects the radical nationalism of the Khmers, who believe that their sovereignty is jeopardized by alliances with major powers. In the mid-1950's, when Sihanouk first adopted the concept under the name "neutrality," nonalignment also reflected a positive response to political and geographical realities in Southeast Asia. Cambodia lay on the frontier between the socialist and "free world" spheres. Because Cambodia was a relatively small and weak power, only Sihanouk's skilled diplomacy prevented either camp from intervening directly in Khmer politics.

During the cold war years, Prince Sihanouk increasingly relied on foreign alliances and contacts to discipline or to assuage national political groups. Thus, he prevailed alternately on conservatives, liberals or socialists to subordinate their personal grievances and demands to the exigencies of Cambodia's larger security problem. This delicate counterbalancing of foreign and national interests came to an end in 1970 because the country's uneven economic growth and fragile political integration required almost constant attention and mediation from the Prince. The sequel was American intervention on an unprecedented scale. Sihanouk quickly realized that genuine internal development was necessary to avoid dependence on or domination by other

powers. Genuine political independence, in this view, is synonymous with self-sufficiency and nonalignment. The revolutionaries, whom Sihanouk once viewed as a threat to independence and nonalignment, were primarily interested in domestic development and had always supported Sihanouk's views on national autonomy. Thus, common interests and complementary skills produced a unique alliance between the Prince and social revolutionaries and prevented their falling out over secondary personality and ideological differences.

In the course of the revolution, Prince Sihanouk assumed full responsibility for international diplomacy. And the RGNU had several vexing diplomatic problems. China's early support of Prince Sihanouk provoked the Soviets into retaining diplomatic relations with the Phnom Penh regime. This affected the RGNU's relations with several East European states. Within the third world, Sihanouk's prestige and acumen earned enough support for the RGNU to come close to regaining its seat in the United Nations General Assembly in 1973 and again in 1974. Beyond the socialist and third worlds, the RGNU made many frustrated efforts to improve its relations with France. France refused to dignify either Cambodian government with formal diplomatic recognition, but accepted diplomatic missions from both, while retaining her embassy in Phnom Penh.

The conclusion of the war brought renewed consideration of the problems of normalizing relations with the industrial West, the pro-Soviet East and neighbors in the Southeast Asian region. (Tense relations with the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, for example, were greatly aggravated by Vietnamese seizure of the Wai Islands during a week of heavy fighting in June.) Still, Prince Sihanouk's first approach was to the United States. In an open letter to *The New York Times* in March, 1975, he expressed the desire of his government to normalize relations with the United States as soon as possible. Reconciliation with the United States and West Europe is central to a successful non-alignment policy and would give the RGNU more flexibility in dealing with socialist powers, notably, the Soviet Union. Sihanouk's initiative and Khieu Samphan's April declaration suggest that the Prince might have returned to Cambodia much earlier than September but for two incidents, the French embassy and the *Mayagüez* affairs. These rapidly complicated Cambodia's already complex foreign relations.

⁷ *Le Monde*, 16 avril, 1975.

⁸ See the reports in *Le Monde* from April 25 to May 12 for an idea of the agitation the embassy affair precipitated in France. Afterward, it emerged that the French vice-counsel in Phnom Penh had exaggerated his reports of privation in the compound.

⁹ Prince Sihanouk and Khieu Samphan made one attempt to expose the ruse. See *Le Monde*, 10 mai, 1975.

In the ninth hour of the war, the French government announced its intentions to extend diplomatic recognition to the RGNU, a gesture acknowledged with gratitude by the Prince.⁷ France then proceeded to keep her Phnom Penh embassy open during the liberation. Hundreds of Frenchmen who had earlier refused to leave the country, journalists of several nationalities, Cambodian officials of the defeated military regime, and diplomats from other foreign missions (including the Soviet embassy) sought and received diplomatic shelter from the French. The abuse of protocol was flagrant even though the wartime emergency was real. The French presumed that an announced intention to establish diplomatic relations gave France the right to act as if these relations were already established. The Paris mission of Sihanouk's government hastened to point out that normal diplomatic conventions required the closing of the embassy and the recalling of all personnel who had dealt with the discredited regime. Formal recognition and the exchange of diplomatic credentials and privileges would follow. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs chose to ignore its own diplomatic and political arrogance. It insisted that food shortages and inadequate sanitation facilities threatened the lives of the more than 600 people crowded into the embassy compound. Requests for permission to fly in emergency supplies were promptly denied by PAFNLK and RGNU officials, who feared French spying or even acts of subversion on top of this new presumption of France's right to take things into her own hands in Cambodia. Ultimately, the French were obliged to surrender Cambodian nationals in their compound; food was provided by the RGNU; and the entire community was evacuated overland by the PAFNLK in a 25-truck convoy in early May.⁸

Once safely in Thailand, many of the Europeans said they had been well treated, but few acknowledged the strain their situation created for their Cambodian hosts. In a country facing food shortages, most Frenchmen came out with heavy baggage and pets. Though they had endured hardships during their weeks of confinement in the embassy, these hardships were on a different scale from those endured by Khmers during and after the war. The French government acted as if the Cambodians owed them apologies for the incident, but this was the huff of defeat. France had none too subtly contrived to exact deference and concessions from the revolutionary regime at a moment when it might have been most vulnerable to pressure.⁹ Unhappy over the prospect of losing her remaining neocolonial privileges, France hoped to maintain her large cultural mission in Cambodia and sought compensation for nationalized rubber plantations. The RGNU refused to be intimidated into accepting relations on France's

terms. Colonial versus anticolonial sentiments, plus resistance on both sides, ended all discussion of diplomatic recognition.

The *Mayagüez* confrontation with the United States began the day after the last French citizens arrived in Thailand. For several days prior to its capture of the United States merchant ship on May 12, 1975, the Cambodian navy had stopped ocean-going vessels passing within six kilometers of Cambodia's coast and offshore islands, to inspect them for espionage materials. The United States State Department issued no warnings to American shipping firms of this activity until after the *Mayagüez* was towed in. Other than this neglect of normally routine advice, there is scant evidence of deliberate American provocation of the confrontation. The United States Seventh Fleet and other American military resources in the region were not in position for the rescue operation that was subsequently ordered. The lack of State Department response to Cambodia's earlier action in stopping ships might be put down to a denial of political integrity to a government too long dismissed as a "faceless," Vietnamese, Chinese or Soviet front. The United States could not appreciate the realities of Khmer politics because it had not accepted its defeat in Cambodia. It responded to the *Mayagüez* capture as if the erroneous reasoning that dictated its long intervention in Cambodia was still operational.

President Ford ordered military forces to the area immediately. Kissinger announced that these would be held in check to allow time to search for a diplomatic solution, but a reconstruction of the timing and the sequence of events shows that there was no delay.¹⁰ Even without negotiations, the *Mayagüez* and its crew were released before United States marines invaded Cambodia's Koh Tang island. Air support for the uninformed ground rescue attempt actually endangered the released crew, who were not held on the island and were at that moment sailing

from the mainland port of Sihanoukville to reclaim the *Mayagüez*, which was anchored just off Koh Tang. United States air raids on Ream and Sihanoukville, having no apparent military function, occurred well after the President knew of the safety of the detained seamen.

In the heat of the affair, the United States announced trade embargoes against Cambodia and South Vietnam, and rode roughshod over Thai government protests that United States use of sovereign Thai air bases as staging areas for the Cambodian invasion violated Thailand's sovereignty and jeopardized her national interests.

In Phnom Penh, RGNU officials learned of the capture of an American ship from United States radio broadcasts. Local PAFNLK commanders had towed the ship in without prior authorization upon discovering suspicious equipment on board. The naval commander at Sihanoukville was summoned to the capital for an explanation and consultations. After three hours of talks, it was decided that the ship as well as its crew should be released. The decision was immediately broadcast on Radio Phnom Penh by a Cabinet minister, but Washington claims it was uncertain about whether the crew was being released along with the ship. Washington further claims there was no time for a follow-up inquiry. Khmer casualties during the bombing of Ream harbor were very high. At least 30 Americans were killed; some 50 were wounded. These were probably unnecessary casualties.¹¹

The affairs of the French embassy and *Mayagüez* confused Kampuchea's peaceful foreign policy intentions with its militant concern for internal security. It has proved impossible for the Khmers to respond effectively to the agitated international press speculation about atrocities, executions, Khmer xenophobia and aggressiveness.¹² These reports reveal more about official United States and French hostility to the Khmer revolution than they do about postwar reconstruction and domestic development in Cambodia. Under these circumstances, the RGNU maintained a low profile in the West for most of the year.

Within the Southeast Asian region, however, the Thai government welcomed RGNU assurances that Cambodia has no territorial ambitions. Normalization of Thai-Cambodian diplomatic relations appears certain now that Bangkok has invited Prince Sihanouk and Vice Premier Ieng Sary to pay official visits.

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¹⁰ Good reconstructions of the confrontation are "Mayagüez: The Unnecessary Victory," *The Sunday Times* (London), May 16, 1975, and "Glory of Mayagüez incident fades as blunders revealed," *The Guardian* (Manchester), May 20, 1975.

¹¹ The Khmer version of the *Mayagüez* incident was reported in the *International Herald Tribune*, September 9, 1975, and in several other major international newspapers at about the same time. The United States State Department declined comment on the report.

¹² The themes are ubiquitous, but some of the more explicit headlines are: "Kissinger affirms that widespread atrocities are committed," *Le Monde*, 14 mai, 1975; "Blood-bath in Cambodia," *Newsweek*, May 12, 1975. Khmer aggression and xenophobia are implied in "Kissinger says ship rescue shows US cannot be pushed," *The Guardian* (Manchester), May 17, 1975; "Cambodian refugees tell of deaths and famine," *The Sunday Times*, June 22, 1975; "Open the Cambodian Cage," *The Guardian* (Manchester), August 21, 1975.

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"In 1954, when the Geneva Accords . . . were signed, Laos was probably not yet a nation," writes this specialist. "Between the early 1960's and the middle 1970's, however, Laos changed, in response to the common suffering of war, the integrating impact of foreign (American) war-planes in the skies, the nationalist (not Communist) propaganda of the Pathet Lao, and the shared reactions to a wide range of new ideas from the outside world. . . ."

From Feudalism to Communism in Laos

BY RICHARD BUTWELL

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THE ESTABLISHMENT of Communist control in Laos after the fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia in April, 1975, seemed surprisingly swift, given the ordinarily slow pace of political and other life in that formerly French Indochinese colony. By September, five months after the Viet Cong and the Khmer Rouge had entered Saigon and Phnom Penh, the ideologically allied Pathet Lao had established effective domination over all of Laos with a minimum of overt violence.¹ Premier (and Prince) Souvanna Phouma, long supported by the United States against the Communists, still headed a nominally coalition government, but changes in that government and other actions left no doubt as to who ruled in Laos.

In effect, the Pathet Lao had taken over one government, the indigenous administration that ruled Laos, and had altogether eliminated another, the long-time "second government" of the United States embassy, with its over-sized Agency for International Development (AID) mission, its military advisers, and its network of Central Intelligence Agency agents and training personnel. By the time of the 1975 observance of the Fourth of July by the United States embassy in Vientiane, there were only 22 United States diplomatic persons left in the country where once there had been more than a thousand. In 1975, Laos was a very different kind of country, with the Communists in control and the Americans on the run.

But the Communist takeover had not happened all that quickly. For at least half a decade, the Pathet Lao had controlled three-fourths of the territory of the country, albeit less than half its population. The belief was widespread that the Communists had the

capability to take over the rest of the land but chose not to do so for fear of provoking United States counteraction, perhaps some kind of re-escalation of American military involvement in the Indochinese war.

The American response to the deteriorating situations in Vietnam and Cambodia and the ultimate collapse of the anti-Communist regimes in those two countries eliminated the Pathet Lao fear that the United States would do anything to halt their takeover. In May, the month after the changing of the political guard in Saigon and Phnom Penh, key non-Communist ministers were maneuvered out of the coalition government that nominally ruled Laos from the administrative capital of Vientiane. By the end of August, the Communists had effectively taken over all the areas either controlled by Souvanna Phouma's non-Communist faction or allied with it, including Vientiane itself.²

The events of May–August, 1975, however, were the political epilogue to a political struggle that began after the end of World War II. In the early months of 1945, the Japanese had declared the independence of Laos, which was at that time probably not yet really a nation. The Laotian nationalists subsequently split. One faction, headed by Prince Souphanouvong (half-brother of Prince Souvanna Phouma and longtime head of the Pathet Lao), threw its political and military lot in with the Ho Chi Minh-led Viet Minh in their nationalist struggle against France in adjacent Vietnam. Laos was not a major battlefield in the initial years of that first Indochina war (1946–1954), but Viet Minh forces did drive deeply into Laos in the final year of the fighting, establishing in the process a territorial base for the Pathet Lao in the northeastern corner of the territory adjacent to what was to become "North Vietnam" following the 1954 Geneva accords that ended the French-Viet Minh struggle. Twice, in 1957 and 1962, coalition

¹ For a good review, see John Everingham, "The Pathet Lao Make It Official," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), September 5, 1975, pp. 39–40.

² See report by David A. Andelman in *The New York Times*, August 24, 1975.

governments were established in Laos, but each time they failed, primarily because the semi-feudal and the Communist revolutionary aims of the main political parties were irreconcilable.³

As long ago as the early 1960's, when American President John F. Kennedy sent 5,000 marines to Thailand as part of a strategy to force a peace in Laos, the Pathet Lao (aided by their North Vietnamese ally) could probably have taken over the country, if they had only the Laotian anti-Communists to reckon with. But there was great fear of what the United States might do in reprisal, and, no less important, fear of a possible Thai takeover of lowland Laos across the Mekong River from Thailand. The majority population of Thailand is ethnically and culturally related to the predominant and lowland inhabitants of Laos, having moved out of south China centuries ago as part of the same major migration. And the preponderant population of the northeastern part of Thailand adjacent to Laos, is even more closely related to the Lao than to the majority Thai. Thus the anti-Communist Vientiane government of the early 1960's refused to request SEATO collective action for fear that this would mean Thai intervention that might become permanent occupation or even annexation.

The Laotian Communists apparently felt confident that they could ultimately defeat the enemy within their country. Meanwhile, they did not want to provoke any kind of de facto foreign occupation of the land. Laotian nationalism was fragile, even as recently as a decade ago, and Pathet Lao and Vientiane government leaders alike remembered the Thai irredentist policy and territorial acquisition in the World War II days of Bangkok's collaboration with Japan. The Communists bided their time, accordingly, steadily sapping the strength of Souvanna Phouma and his allies. This period lasted at least ten years, and it was not until the start of the second quarter of 1975 that the Pathet Lao⁴ felt that the time was ripe for a takeover. The action was hardly swift, though it seemed so to some, being at least a decade overdue.

Efforts to negotiate a settlement in Laos had begun in 1971, strongly supported by the United States (which apparently believed that genuine coalition government and neutralization in Laos were possible). It was not until February, 1973, however, the month after the pact that ended the United States military

presence in Vietnam, that an agreement was concluded between Souvanna Phouma and the Pathet Lao. Another six months passed before a further accord regarding implementation of the February settlement was reached. And in April, 1974, the February and September pacts were finally brought into force with the creation of a coalition government involving equal participation of Communist and non-Communist elements. Souvanna Phouma remained as Prime Minister despite his past association with the Americans (who had bombed Pathet Lao territory as well as the so-called "Ho Chi Minh" trail that passed through eastern Laos on the way from North to South Vietnam).

THE COMMUNISTS' STRATEGY

Through the years it has been the custom of foreign newsmen and diplomats to underestimate the Pathet Lao. The Laotian Communists, it was claimed, were not real Communists; the North Vietnamese had done most of their fighting for them. Moreover, when the Vietnamese went home, the Pathet Lao would succumb to the lethargic pace of life in Vientiane and elsewhere in the country. (as almost everybody else, including the non-Communist government, did). In April, 1974, accordingly, when the Communists accepted only half of the 12 portfolios in the new coalition government (although their military position seemingly entitled them to a greater representation) their moderation was widely noted, as was their alleged inability or unwillingness to press their advantage.

But such analysis missed the point. The Communists controlled most of the country. Time was on their side; there was no reason to hurry. The Americans were clearly getting out of Vietnam, and their political protégé, Lon Nol, was fighting a losing battle in Cambodia. Premier Souvanna Phouma, moreover, was old and ill. He had suffered a heart attack in 1974 at the age of 73, and his days of leadership were obviously numbered. In addition, Souvanna Phouma had never really been anti-Communist; he was rather anti-foreign. He was opposed to the Communist Vietnamese just as he had been opposed to the Americans in the late 1950's and early 1960's when the United States upset his first attempt to establish a coalition government and neutralization. In 1975, Souvanna Phouma apparently saw his role as a bridge between the old and new orders. Announcing that he would step down from politics altogether in 1976, he played the role of mediator with great nationalist dedication.⁵

There were two other aspects of Laotian politics that the Communists appreciated more than anyone else: the almost complete dependence of the anti-Communist political elite on the United States, and the development of the country from a group of loosely related feudal fiefdoms to a nation. Between

³ The best study of the relationship between the Pathet Lao and North Vietnam through the 1960's is Paul F. Langer and Joseph Zasloff, *North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao: Partners in the Struggle for Laos* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

⁴ For a superb study of the Laotian Communists, see Joseph Zasloff, *The Pathet Lao: Leadership and Organization* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973).

⁵ For an interesting, if brief, interview with Prince Souvanna Phouma on the events in Laos through late August, 1975, see *The New York Times*, August 25, 1975.

1965 and 1975, only American support really kept the Laotian anti-Communists politically afloat. Already, by the mid-1960's, such formerly all-important political figures as Prince Boun Oum and Phoui Sananikone (and their families and followers) had declined in importance. But prominent-family-dominated Laos was still very much a feudal society politically and economically. Vientiane politics had no roots among the people. The politicians—including Souvanna Phouma—survived because the Americans propped them up as part of the great American crusade against communism. When that crusade ended in the 1970's, the Laotian anti-Communists fell one after another, "little dominoes" in the Indochina war.

No less important was the change in Laos itself. In 1954, when the Geneva accords that ended the first Indochina war were signed, Laos was probably not yet a nation. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., who served in the John F. Kennedy administration, once called Laos "a state by diplomatic courtesy,"⁶ probably an accurate description at the time. Between the early 1960's and the middle 1970's, however, Laos changed, in response to the common suffering of war, the integrating impact of foreign (American) warplanes in the skies, the nationalist (not Communist) propaganda of the Pathet Lao, and the shared reactions to a wide range of new ideas from the outside world (the Soviet-influenced portion no less than the American).

In 1974, the stage was set for the 1975 Communist political takeover of Laos when the leader of the Pathet Lao, Prince Souphanouvong, assumed leadership of the Joint National Political Council, which was created as part of the settlement that ended the fighting in the country. Souvanna Phouma remained as Premier, but Souphanouvong headed a new political organ free from the taint of excessive past association with the often overbearing American diplomatic establishment in Vientiane. Souvanna Phouma, moreover, sought to play a reconciling rather than partisan role after the April, 1974, establishment of the third Laotian coalition government, in effect defaulting to Prince Souphanouvong, who thus became the strong political advocate in the new Laotian politics.⁷

⁶ Quoted by Wolfgang Saxon in *The New York Times*, August 24, 1975.

⁷ For a brief but excellent review of how communism came to power in Laos, see Charles W. Yost, "Laos: how it happened," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 29, 1975. Mr. Yost was the first U.S. ambassador to Laos after the 1954 Geneva accords.

⁸ Quoted in Marc Bloch, "It's Just a Matter of Time," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), July 11, 1975, p. 18.

⁹ For a good review, see John Everingham, "When the Rightists Become Leftists," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), August 15, 1975, p. 14.

After the fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia in April, 1975 (a year after the establishment of the third Laotian coalition government), the Communists chose to make their big move. "Liberating" towns, districts, and villages from "foreign control," the Pathet Lao "took back the country," as they put it, from the Americans. In many quarters, their actions were highly popular—for many non-Communists had grown sensitive to the American presence and to the de facto "second government" role of the United States embassy. "People's councils" were established to oversee government administration in various jurisdictions, and "liberation committees" assumed the responsibility for "unifying" parts of the country previously under the control of the politically feudal families of the pre-Communist era.

Force played a part in the process, albeit an indirect one. In a late June declaration, the Lao Patriotic Front, the political organization of the Pathet Lao, "ardently hoped that (national leaders) clearly understood their heavy historical duty" and would join the fight against "Laotian reactionaries." The Front also expressed the hope that leaders of the government—meaning Souvanna Phouma and the remaining non-Communists—"would not allow themselves to be lured by [reactionaries] and be used as a screen behind which [reactionaries] could hide and operate criminal moves."⁸ Very little violence occurred in the period from May through late August, when the administrative capital of Vientiane itself was "liberated," but the ever present possibility of the use of force—increasingly monopolized by the Pathet Lao—clearly underlay the Communists' political actions.

The Communists were "reunifying" the country, they said, and, in fact, they were doing so. Not only were they reuniting the Communist and non-Communist portions of the land, however, but they were also integrating the military forces of the two sides under Communist leadership. Many senior officers, not surprisingly, fled the country, as did top figures in the CIA-trained and -financed Meo tribesmen "clandestine army." But most officers and even more rank-and-file soldiers, like the overwhelming preponderance of civil servants and police, remained, partly because they lacked the means to leave and partly because they were probably not really politically partisan. The Pathet Lao called the army and the civil service the "twin instruments of American neo-colonialism," but most members of both groups were allowed to remain in government service, subject to indoctrination in political seminars and other types of re-education. Only the few remaining major figures were removed, and often dispatched to remote locations for more lengthy political reorientation.

There were probably several reasons for the comparatively low-key character of the Communist takeover.⁹ To begin with, relations between the Com-

munists and the non-Communists were never so strained as they had been in Vietnam and Cambodia. Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong, after all, were half-brothers, and Souvanna Phouma himself had twice tried to make coalition governments work—governments that had failed for reasons other than his duplicity or political scheming. The most reactionary of the old feudal politicians and soldiers, moreover, like the formerly CIA-supported right-wing general, Phoumi Nosavan, had long since left the country; others, like Phoui Sananikone and Boun Oum, had left more recently. Finally, the process of takeover had begun more than two full years before, with the peace agreement of February, 1973. The intervening period, which included the establishment of the coalition government in April, 1974, gave the Pathet Lao no reason to believe that there were any significant opposition elements. If the Communist goal was reunification of the country, there was no point in spilling blood needlessly.

The political-administrative structure in Laos today is only temporary. National elections conducted by the Communists are set for April, 1976; from these will come the new legitimate rulers of Laos. Premier Souvanna Phouma has stated that he will retire altogether from politics at that time, and there is no doubt that the next Prime Minister will be a member of the Lao Patriotic Front. This will complete the Pathet Lao takeover of the country and will officially inaugurate the era of a Communist Laotian kingdom, which may be unique among the Communist nations of the world in retaining its traditional monarchy.

PRIMARY PROBLEMS

The Communist rulers of Laos will face many problems. The most important of these will probably be the state of the economy. A very much underdeveloped land with negligible exports, Laos today is virtually bankrupt. In mid-1975, the United States, Japan, Britain, France, and Australia agreed to continue to provide foreign support of the *kip*, the country's currency,¹⁰ but whether these nations, particularly the United States, would continue to do so was problematical. The war of the last 12 years has left the country with tremendous destruction, with at least one-fifth of the 3.2 million Laotian refugees requiring aid of one kind or another. In September, 1975, there was almost no gasoline in Laos. Even rice was in short supply, although the situation was eased by imports from China. The Pathet Lao leadership apparently hoped to avoid the extreme economic measures taken across the border in Cambodia, but it was not at all certain that they could do so. If extreme measures become necessary, the moderate

style that has characterized the political takeover of the country could undergo drastic transformation.

Whether or not the Communists can make the economy work is not the only problem confronting the Laotian leadership. The flight of large numbers of civil servants, technicians, and other skilled and experienced persons has left the land with very limited human resources. Laos did not do much for herself in the heyday of American influence, and today there are even fewer trained nationals to operate the economy, teach in the schools, manage the power facilities, and perform other key functions. Moreover, the human flight from the country has by no means ended. At least 20,000 Laotians have already crossed over into neighboring Thailand, and almost daily there are reports of firing by Laotian border patrols on "smugglers," who are not smugglers at all but refugees from Laos.

The presence of such large numbers of refugees on Thai soil and the attraction of Thailand as the destination of more refugees in the future are sure to continue to strain already tense Thai-Laotian relations (despite the fact that the Bangkok government does not welcome such Laotians because of the obvious security problems they pose). Thailand has improved her relations with both China and the Soviet Union in the past year, but six months after the fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia, Thai relations with the Communist rulers of the three Indochinese states were not significantly improved. This is because of the threat posed to Thailand by the changes in the political orders of those states. It is unlikely that there will be any early improvement, least of all in the case of Laos, where 12,000 Thai, "disguised" as Laotians, fought against the Pathet Lao at the height of the American-financed war.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Relations with the United States have also deteriorated, as might have been expected, since the Communist takeover in Laos. The American embassy was reduced to its present 22-person staff—a far cry from the days in which the United States mission's telephone book was bigger than that for all of Laos. The United States was "the body managing the Lao government," the Pathet Lao has charged,¹¹ and as such it had to be cut down to size. The surprising

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¹⁰ *The New York Times*, July 16, 1975.

¹¹ Quoted by H. D. S. Greenway, in *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), July 7, 1975.

"The military remains the power behind the throne of Thailand; it is the greatest single agglomeration of disciplined power in a society that is almost coming loose at the seams—superficially—because of the proliferation of organizations making suggestions to settle Thai problems, internal and external."

Thailand: In Search of the Lost Trail

BY L. EDWARD SHUCK, JR.

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EMOTIONAL FATIGUE is unavoidable after two decades of heady violence and oversimplified politicking in Southeast Asia. A focus on Thai affairs can be distorted by dramatic headlines and a temptation to overlook the glacial pace of change. The drama of urbanization does not obscure the fact that the vast majority of the population remains tied to village and soil. The glittering and proliferating piles of concrete and glass that increasingly distort human existence in Southeast Asia remain hostages to the life styles, the pace, the superstitions, the allegiance patterns of the village. This encourages superficiality in the analysis of Thai affairs, especially since the mid-1960's, when the Thai military clique became the constant companion of the Pentagon, abandoning the ancient self-protection of neutrality that had served Thailand so well. This bedding down included gratuitous and unprovoked war-making by the Thai against the winning side in Laos, in Cambodia, and in Vietnam. Since 1971, astute Thai leadership has painstakingly moved sideways, grudgingly but under unavoidable compulsions. The difficulty of changing color and appearance to blend in with the new political necessities in Southeast Asia is formidable.

Predicting events in Thailand can be foolhardy. The country has been relatively leisurely in its economic modernization. Thai devotion to past attitudes and allegiance systems remains stable. Family capitalism was—and is—supported by a reasonably

well-balanced economy, with technological development ingested at a safe pace.¹

But the events of October, 1973, brought restlessness to the passive and served to politicize the apathetic, at least in Bangkok and other urban communities. In the past, the subjects of the King of Thailand were unique among Southeast Asian communities in providing their government with a social stability on which all elements instinctively relied. The royal family is a very real anchor for social control and careful timing of socioeconomic change. The Thai economy has usually been stable and balanced enough to provide minimal necessities for the population and, consequent domestic tranquillity far greater than that found anywhere in Southeast Asia except for Cambodia (before the American invasion of 1970). Nor has Thailand bled from internal or external war wounds in the twentieth century, unlike the rest of Southeast Asia. The Thai have not been victims of naive and uncomprehending national governance, as have the Burmese. The inherent social unity of Thailand is strong, even allowing for the significant but not yet dangerous centripetal forces of dissident minorities inhabiting villages well beyond the Chao Phya Valley.

The Muslim majorities in the southern Kra Peninsula Provinces do harbor distaste and disloyalty for Bangkok;² and so do the remnants of the Malayan Communist party (MCP) and a modest agglomeration of individuals loyal to the Communist party of Thailand (CPT). Problems have been created by the large Lao minority, and the lesser 85,000-member Vietnamese minority of the northeast, the latter the result in the main of the 1946–1954 fighting in Vietnam (augmented recently by refugees from both Vietnam and Laos as the Viet Minh/Pathet Lao took over their respective countries). Especially disturbing are the some 29,000 Meo tribesmen, led and maintained by the United States Central Intelligence Agency un-

¹ Those making decisions about current Thai affairs would find very interesting and useful Norman Jacobs, *Modernization without Development: Thailand as an Asian Case Study* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971). A fine report also appeared in William Warren, "Letter from Bangkok," *The New York Times Magazine*, February 10, 1975. In parts, however, this last piece is overly enthusiastic and far too definite about the happenings of October, 1973.

² *The New York Times*, July 1, 1975, report by David Andalman.

der their "General" Vang Pao, who fled almost en masse from Laos as the Pathet Lao digested the remainder of community political power.³ This is a tragic story and is another American burden resulting from the direct American military interference in political competition in Indochina. In August, 1975, the Thai government secured the aid of three international relief organizations, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Inter-Governmental Committee for European Migration, to take care of the 40,000 Khmer, Lao, and Vietnamese refugees.

These refugees from South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are in areas that are not as securely tied to the central valley leadership of Thailand as efficient government requires. The loosely knit Thai society, made more so by the new openness after the events of October, 1973, is more vulnerable to two facets of Chinese influence: China and Chinese as the historic, massive, psychological and economic cloud always on the northern horizon, and Maoism as a doctrine that seeps through any border. Both these Chinese influences are of inestimable and unmeasurable significance to Southeast Asian leadership.

There is a new openness in Thai life since the October, 1973, ouster of the triumvirate of Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, his son, Colonel Narong Kittikachorn, and General Praphas Charusathien, Narong Kittikachorn's father-in-law. The well-publicized role of student organizations in opening the Thai society to new levels of communication while successfully demanding that the government be led formally by civilians is a special phenomenon.⁴ Nevertheless, it is not yet clear that the new student movements and their leaders are widely radicalized, as is usual among Japanese and Western students. To be politically active and "aware" is by no means to be revolutionary. Filial piety in Thailand is very durable. In brief, in spite of the dramatic and confusing shuffling of governments, and the rewording of constitutional documents, there is an enduring same-

ness in political feeling and an even more uniform continuity among the attitudes of public leaders. Even the recent sacking of the home of Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj by undisciplined policemen protesting the breakdown of law and order, and the nearly contemptuous attacks upon the facilities of Thammasat University by vocational school students must be regarded as brief interludes. These events reflect ideological and social confusion, predictable after the promulgation of the highly publicized new constitution of 1974, the elections of January, 1975, and the legal validation of Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj in a required vote of confidence by the newly elected National Assembly. Twenty-two parties won seats. The result was the formation of a conservative ruling coalition.⁵ The election itself was noted for the continuing and indigenous Thai political apathy; only about 30 percent of the eligibles in Bangkok and less than 50 percent of the eligibles in the entire country voted.⁶ But the government seems committed to a maximum of openness, for a time at least, while it walks a tightrope between the increasing strength of the extremists of both right and left.

The CPT continues its hostility to the government, and has announced its intent—in the maoist manner—to unite students, farmers, intellectuals, and city workers in an anti-government coalition.⁷ The Peoples' Liberation Army, founded in 1969 as the arm of the Thailand Patriotic Front that had merged with other anti-government, Marxist groups in 1965, remains active in the northeast.

Apathy and resignation are still important, more so than any enthusiasm for the new government, since the old hands remain in power in Bangkok. The military have endured considerable publicity for killing and torturing alleged Communists and burning and looting villages in the northeast—a not uncommon practice. The government is center/conservative in tone. The right wing is represented by the direct protégés, among generals, of the ruling powers of the 1950's and 1960's. Even with this coalition in power, the right wing is organizing extra-governmental opposition. The threat that undisciplined students—particularly right-wing students like the *Red Guars* (sic)—will join with their elders, present and retired military men of power, now organized in the NAVAPOL, to resist "communism" in a unified right-wing movement is a growing concern.⁸ In the three most southern Kra Peninsula Provinces, the centuries-old conflict between a dominant Thai Buddhist minority and the 90 percent of the population which is Malay Muslim continues. This situation becomes no more endurable with the input of MCP elements and the new openness that permits organizational and propaganda activities among the formerly apathetic.

Except for the three scapegoats mentioned above,

³ See, e.g., Peter A. Poole, "The Vietnamese in Cambodia and Thailand: Their Role in Interstate Relations," *Asian Survey*, April, 1974. Note also *The New York Times*, October 30, 1973. Another good report is that of Matt Franjola, in *ibid.*, August 15, 1975.

⁴ An excellent day-by-day report in some depth of the events of October was published by the *Bangkok Post*, in a special supplement entitled, "The Ten Days," available from the *Bangkok Post* (Bangkok, 1973).

⁵ Note report by Denzil Peiris, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 14, 1975.

⁶ Jeffrey Race, "The Thai Elections," *Asian Survey*, April, 1975. Good coverage is also available in the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, issues of January and February, 1975.

⁷ See, for example, Stephen I. Alpern, "Insurgency in Northeast Thailand," in *ibid.*, August, 1975. Note also *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 17, 1974.

⁸ See article by Norman Peagram, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 25, 1975.

the military clique remains intact; it was strong in each of the Cabinets that followed the events of October, including the present Cabinet.* The middle-of-the-road National Student Centre, led by students of Thammasat University, and the more right-oriented students from the vocational schools, identify a major division within the total student community, a division that delights the military group. Vocational student groups, who feel they are condescended to by the "intellectuals" of the universities, notably Thammasat and Chulalongkorn and who (by no means incidentally) are not given enough credit for their roles in the events of October, are generally less critical at present both of the military and of the general policies of the government. The critics come largely from the higher status and more socially secure university types. With a disruption in student unity, and in light of the conservative results of the elections of January, 1975, the military/civilian group that has dominated Thai politics since at least the 1940's seems but slightly discommoded. Its members have been warned that techniques and postures must change. Beyond that, one cannot predict any substantive alteration of economic and social relations in the Thai society.⁹ Stylistic changes, in themselves, do not identify a revolution.

The inability of the Kukrit government to effect economic improvements in a world plagued by special economic problems may prove dangerous. While the military is satisfied to have a civilian bear the brunt of public dissatisfactions, there is also a point at which the military will move in to control the scene, if only as a preservative effort. In Bangkok and elsewhere, the lack of efficient public services, growing economic discomforts, and even hunger and destitution are continuing facts.¹⁰ The new (for Thailand) phenomenon of strikes by public service employees, including garbage collectors and postal employees, that marked the month of September, 1975, is not only a menace to security and a demonstration to many Thais of continuing bureaucratic inadequacy. It may well build a public mood for a return to a more tightly ordered society. The military will return to direct and overt military control when the mood is right.

* As of October, 1975.

⁹ For an interesting report on growing right-wing unity amid continuing student division, see the article by Norman Peagram, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 25, 1975. See also Robert F. Zimmerman, "Student Revolution in Thailand: The End of the Thai Bureaucratic Policy?" *Asian Survey*, June, 1974, for a somewhat opposing position supportive of the faith that major changes have indeed occurred in Thai political psychology.

¹⁰ See David Andalman, in *The New York Times*, September 24, 1975.

¹¹ Note translation of this 11-chapter, 238-section document, published by the *Government Gazette, Bangkok*, vol. 91, part 169, dated October 7, 1974, available courtesy of embassy of Thailand, Washington, D.C.

The "right" time will certainly be a time of massive popular disenchantment with a civilian Prime Minister. For Thai, law and order, combined with a sureness of what to expect in this hierarchical community, are very important.

Internally, the design of political life preserves traditional aristocratic privilege. The much-reported constitution of 1932 granted by the King under pressure from aristocratic "modernizers" was, after all, a Magna Carta, not a Declaration of the Rights of Man. And the constitution of 1974, latest in a long line of constitutional documents handed down by committees appointed by the Throne in Privy Council, is strictly in that tradition, with a few touches of egalitarian postures.¹¹ Admittedly, the sections in this wordy document devoted to promises of qualified social change, guarantees of economic security and of leveling practices in the future cannot be dismissed as cant.

The politicizing of the population, especially the urban youth, has been accelerated by the events of October (1973). The increasing number of those who are restless and those who want to participate in public decision-making (if only through an expanded suffrage and the economic device of the strike) make the erosion of traditional power settings a fact. The Thai leadership must promote economic stability and law and order, irrespective of ideological considerations. At the same time, the hardly innovative or energetic group under Prime Minister Kukrit must also build upon the efforts of the past five years to alter the international postures of Thailand.

King Phumiphon has enormous prestige as a contributor to a proud Thai nationalism, and as an effective leader through whom all or any politician must act if he hopes securely to control the population. Such prestige and consequent political clout have become stronger as a result of the King's handling of the coups and countercoups of 1971 and 1973, the periods of the working out of constitutional rearrangements, the royal endorsement of the constitution of 1974 and the National Assembly election of January, 1975. The King is a focal point of loyalty for all but the armed dissidents; and, one may suggest, even for many of the disaffected and alienated. The King as a stabilizing force can postpone overt military dominance, which through the years has arranged the positions of the players and planners within the power-holding elite. One can, with caution, predict that future domination from military figures, at least in the short and middle run, will remain far more circumscribed and covert. The Thai community is held together by an ancient rhythm of family relations and embedded social responsibilities.

Yet the rapidly changing political environment of Southeast Asia requires modifications in the nature of public responsibility, concern for modern forms of

jurisprudence and of public administration, and the acceptance of the social leveling that is inherent in social mobility.

During the 1970's, Thailand has expanded her interest and leadership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), hoping that ASEAN can become an increasing political force as well as an instrument for economic and cultural interchange. The Thai have also sought the membership in ASEAN of the states of Indochina. The Thai give great attention to strengthening ASEAN as a prelude to any hope of neutrality for the region.¹²

Since 1970, the government has been devoted to atoning for its wholehearted alignment with the American military activities in Indochina. Aiding the United States in order to inhibit evolving forms of Maoist governance in Indochina proved a careless commitment, in part rising out of Thai wariness of Marxism as an economic dogma and practice totally alien to Thai culture. The United States commitment was supported by large segments of the population. Nevertheless, in a larger sense, this alignment ran counter to the most important historic imperatives in all the societies of Southeast Asia—the effort to establish politics and government systems identifiable as national and indigenous, rather than as foreign imports. The secret of Maoist strength has always been its appeal to “positive” nationalism, as well as to social rebellion. The larger Southeast Asian rebellion against the Western power values that had been superficially welded to the societies of the region reflects the most authentic source of tension in Southeast Asia.

In the 1970's, the Thai are reflecting their historic role as handmaid and political protégé (even if one cannot precisely say “dependency”) of China, a definition which both Maoist and Chiangist retain. During recent years, the Thai government has insisted on the withdrawal of United States forces from Thailand;¹³ more modestly when the generals had overt control, more openly and insistently since the events of October and the election campaign of 1974–1975. In 1974, the United States acquiesced in a plan to withdraw all American forces within 18 months. The former command center for the American air war

in Indochina—Nakhorn Phanom—was to be closed by the end of October, 1975. By that time, only 16,500 United States troops were to remain in the country, down from some 50,000 at the height of the American bombing of Indochina in 1972. In the fall of 1975, Thailand was pulling in its already cropped military horns by withdrawing its 80-man contingent from Korea—ending a presence and a posture maintained through 25 years.

Thai government action in recent years seems unusual only when the experiences of the past are overlooked. For seven centuries, and as late as the middle of the last century, it was expected that Thai kings would send tribute to and acknowledge the moral supremacy (read “power”) of the Middle Kingdom. In terms of foreign dominance, Thailand asserted her independence from China only as she was able to hide behind the skirts of the Western giants, Great Britain, France and, most important, the United States.

In an effort to regain Thailand's initiative and, most important, her neutrality, and to respond to new realities, Thai leaders were forced to readjust their relationships with both China and the United States. These efforts go back at least to 1971.¹⁴ The events of October, 1973, accelerated them. Within weeks of these events, interim Prime Minister Sanya Dharma-sakti, civilian and Thammasat University professor, explained to the newly appointed interim National Legislative Assembly:

... the Government ... will take steps to further good relations with all countries, which are friendly towards Thailand, including countries with different political ideologies, and will promote and strengthen friendly relations and understanding with neighboring countries. Furthermore, the Government will participate actively in regional cooperation, particularly in the context of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), for the promotion of peace, stability, and economic and social development in the interest of progress, prosperity and well-being of the peoples of the region.¹⁵

On January 7, 1974, Sanya repeated these ideas in a broad policy statement to the National Legislative Assembly covering the posture and plans of his government.¹⁶

The spring of 1974 was a time of accelerated normalization of relations with Marxist societies. Romania, Mongolia (claimed by both Chinas) and Czechoslovakia were recognized, while trade talks continued with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the DPRK (North Korea).

In December, 1974, an important mission of Thai, led by Anand Panyarachan, Permanent Representative of Thailand to the United Nations, visited Peking in an attempt to enlarge trade between Thailand and China. A more politically oriented group, led by Minister of Foreign Affairs (General) Chitichai Choonhaven, went to Peking in early January, 1975.

¹² A clear and thorough statement was made by Minister of Foreign Affairs (General) Chitichai Choonhaven, to the eighth ministerial meeting of ASEAN, Kuala Lumpur, May 13, 1975. Published by the Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations, *Press Release*, no. 15, June 12, 1975.

¹³ *Loc. cit.*

¹⁴ For the foreign policy developments of 1972 and 1973 I call attention to my article in *Current History*, December, 1973.

¹⁵ Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations, *Press Release*, no. 17, November 6, 1973.

¹⁶ *The New York Times*, January 8, 1975 (also *China Post* [Taipei] December 5, 1974).

While still Vice Minister, Chitichai had led a similar mission to Peking a year before.

In terms of historical development, the crucial act of 1975 was the establishment of diplomatic relations between Thailand and the People's Republic of China, on July 1, 1975. On the same day, Thailand ended her long diplomatic connection with Taiwan. In Peking, the joint communiqué that established diplomatic relations, signed by Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and Kukrit Pramoj, assured the world that the PRC would "respect the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Thailand" and that China would agree that "all foreign aggression and subversion and all attempts by any country to control any other country or to interfere in its internal affairs are impermissible and are to be condemned."

In his speech on this occasion, the possible heir to Chinese political power, Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, reiterated China's promises not to interfere in the internal affairs of Thailand, nor to assist in any way movements subversive to the Thai government. The now usual references to the Bandung ideas of 1955—Pancha Sila—were stressed, as Teng stated:

... Foreign aggression and interference are impermissible and are doomed to failure. We consider that countries with different social systems can develop state relations on the basis of the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.¹⁷

Kukrit responded, in part:

... The foreign policy objective of this government (Thai) is to follow an independent course in promoting peaceful coexistence on the principle of friendship with all countries professing good intention towards Thailand without regard to differences in political ideologies or governmental systems, and based on the principles of justice, equality, and non-interference, in either direct or indirect forms, in the internal affairs of each other. It is for this reason that the recognition and normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China had high priority in the conduct of the foreign policy of my government.

Kukrit continued to refer to Thailand's vital interest in strengthening ASEAN and developing its political content.

... For this reason the Government of Thailand warmly

¹⁷ *Peking Review*, July 4, 1975, pp. 8-13, Peng's quote from p. 11.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, September 5, 1975.

²⁰ *The New York Times*, June 25, 1975. Note a valuable background monograph, Daniel D. Lovelace, *China and the People's War in Thailand, 1964-1969* (Berkeley: University of California Press, Center for Chinese Studies, 1971).

²¹ Note the interview of Tun Abdul Razak by Richard M. Smith of *Newsweek*, republished in full in *Malaysian Digest*, June 30, 1975.

welcomes the pronouncements of the Government of the People's Republic of China in support of ASEAN and the desire of ASEAN countries to see Southeast Asia a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality.¹⁸

Within days, the Peking government was reinstituting its warm support for the Communist party of Thailand, congratulating it on its tenth anniversary of "war against the Government" (of Thailand) as carried on by the Thai People's Liberation Army.¹⁹

On July 24, the two Southeast Asian members of SEATO, Thailand and the Philippines, both of whom had just exchanged diplomatic recognition with the PRC, called for the dissolution of SEATO.²⁰ SEATO is long dead, and this gesture merely combined with the diplomatic recognition of the PRC formally to end an era. Thailand has joined Malaysia in demanding the neutralization of Southeast Asia.²¹

ASEAN continues to have internal difficulties, as would be expected in a group historically composed of "natural" enemies, with institutional variations artificially enlarged by long contact with Western domination. Under the leadership of Indonesia and Malaysia, ASEAN's economic potential is being pushed. The Thai desire more political strength and greater mutuality of declared interest; their conflicts with Malaysia over the Kra Peninsula territories and with Laos and Cambodia with regard to boundary disputes seem to offer natural areas wherein habits of peaceful consultation may mature. Interference from the three giants, China, the Soviet Union, and the United States, as well as from Japan, should accelerate the maturation of ASEAN. Cambodia and Thailand are talking to one another again and trying to resolve their differences, which reached a nadir with the collapse of Lon Nol and the related *Mayagüez* incident. Cambodian and Thai officials met in July, 1975, in an effort to reestablish both diplomatic and trade relations. (Less publicized than United States-Thai and Thai-Chinese relations have been the efforts of the Russians to warn the third world about Chinese ambitions and to secure some of the "goodies" for themselves. Russian visits to Bangkok continued through 1974 and can be expected to continue.)

RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

By June, 1975, Prime Minister Kukrit was identifying the presence of Americans as more of an embar-
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"... the Vietnamese leaders have a major, concrete stake in the normalization of relations with the United States government. The United States remains the stumbling block to the exploration of offshore Vietnamese oilfields because of its trade embargo against the two Vietnams."

The Revolutionary Government of Vietnam

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THE SWIFT and relatively bloodless victory of the revolutionary armed forces in March and April, 1975, climaxed by the hasty American evacuation from Saigon by helicopter, marked the end of one era in Vietnam and the beginning of another. After 30 years of struggle against foreign powers and the regimes they fostered, Vietnam's revolutionaries had achieved their goal of eliminating all outside intervention in the country's political development.

The new phase of the revolution was one of reunification and integration, within families, within South Vietnamese society, and between the two zones of the country. As families sought long-lost sons, brothers and husbands through the columns of *Saigon Liberation* set aside for the purpose, the urban population in general was becoming acquainted for the first time with the revolutionary cadres and soldiers whom they had been taught for many years to fear.¹ And North and South Vietnam began the process of knitting themselves together after more than two decades of separation.

In some fundamental ways, Vietnam was already reunified. Hundreds of thousands of North Vietnamese soldiers and cadres, and southerners who had regrouped to the North in 1954, had gone to the South during the war to fight and often to die. With the end of the war, all revolutionary forces, North or South, were considered once more to be under a single unified command, the Vietnam People's Army, as they

had been until the beginning of the second war of resistance.² The seventeenth parallel was now an administrative convenience rather than an externally imposed boundary, as the Lao Dong party's leadership of the revolution in both zones made sure that they would develop in close coordination in the future.

But the Lao Dong party intended to maintain a separate South Vietnamese administration, with its own distinct institutions and policies, for as long as it was necessary to bring the social, economic and political base in the South more into line with that in the North. The basic reason for delaying reunification was simple. To establish a unified administration over both zones while the South still reflected the cultural, economic and political influences of its recent past would risk influencing the development of the North in a negative way.

"There must be time for both zones to ponder, to weigh different aspects of the problem before coming to any solution," said Lao Dong party Central Committee spokesman Hoang Tung immediately after the war's end.³ After a series of meetings in Saigon in May, 1975, among party leaders from both North and South Vietnam on the problem of reunification and other postwar issues, it was agreed that no time limit could yet be put on the transitional period during which there would be two zones and two administrations. But the period was defined informally in terms of years.⁴

Reflecting these realities, the regime in South Vietnam, as Nguyen Huu Tho, the president of the Provisional Revolutionary Government's Advisory Council pointed out, was not a "socialist" regime but a "democratic-progressive" one, in which the rights of the national bourgeoisie—those segments of the bourgeoisie that had been independent of the United States-sponsored regime—would be respected.⁵ The legitimate political life of the South was defined by those who had opposed United States intervention in Vietnam, while those individuals and groups that had maintained their support for the anti-Communist

¹ See Gareth Porter, "Vietnam: Reconciliation Begins," *Christian Century*, June 11-18, 1975, p. 600.

² The formula said to be used in Hanoi in July, 1975, was "Vietnam has one Party, one army and two governments," Malcolm Salmon, "North Vietnam's High Profile in the South," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 1, 1975, p. 20.

³ Text of an interview with Hoang Tung by American visitors, May 6, 1975, in Indochina Peace Campaign newsletter, May 18, 1975, p. 3.

⁴ UPI dispatch, Saigon, *Washington Post*, May 31, 1975; Reuter Dispatch, Saigon, *The New York Times*, May 18, 1975.

⁵ Interview with Terziano Terzani, *Der Spiegel*, June 30, 1975, p. 65.

policies of the United States and the former administration were deprived of their right to participate in politics.

The leaders of the "third force," which had been viewed by party leaders as the key to a negotiated political settlement during the war, were to be integrated into the postwar political structure, as members of the government and as leading figures in the National Liberation Front (NLF), which still functioned as a broad political front for all revolutionary forces. Whether or not they had been ideologically committed to a socialist Vietnam, those who had participated in the struggle against the former regime were regarded as part of the revolution. A PRG official indicated a few weeks after liberation that those who had "struggled for peace and independence and against the United States and Thieu" would be rewarded with "worthy positions."⁶ The first confirmation of the important role that former "third force" figures would play in the new regime was the formation of the presidium of the NLF Committee for "Ho Chi Minh City" (Saigon), which included such personalities as lawyer Tran Ngoc Lieng, former chairman of the "People's Committee for the Implementation of the Paris Agreement," Ho Ngoc Nhuan, a former opposition Catholic member of the National Assembly, Catholic professor and writer Ly Chanh Trung, and Vo Dinh Cuong, a Buddhist layman formerly considered close to Thich Tri Quang.⁷

Although all publications that had been part of the approved anti-Communist system of the past were outlawed, individuals who had a record of patriotic activities during the war could still publish newspapers and magazines. In an interview in July, Nguyen Huu Tho said that the new government intended to permit the publication of "several" private newspapers.⁸ In August, Ngo Cong Duc, the former publisher of the popular opposition newspaper, *Tin Sang*, and a member of the National Assembly, who fled

from threatened imprisonment by Nguyen Van Thieu in 1971, returned to Saigon to resume the publication of his paper.

Before the party leadership could begin to think about socialism in South Vietnam, it first had to restore normalcy to the shattered society and economy. That meant reestablishing security, restoring production, stabilizing living standards, eliminating the vestiges of the old regime and integrating its personnel into the new society. Responsibility for dealing with these immediate problems was given to a Military Management Committee composed of four officers of the Vietnam People's Army and seven civilians, which administered the capital area on behalf of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG), to which it was formally responsible.⁹ The ministers of the PRG, who remained in the background, studied longer-term policies and visited the provinces to gather data on which to base their policy decisions.¹⁰

Colonel General Tran Van Tra, chairman of the military administrative committee, declared in his first press conference that because of the problem of security he could not say in advance how long the committee would remain in existence.¹¹ Although most former Saigon military personnel registered with their local revolutionary committees as required, a minority remained in hiding, many because of an unwarranted fear of reprisals. By early July, some of those who had failed to register with the new government had turned themselves in, often at the request of their families, who had learned that their treatment would be lenient. "A number of families which had hidden their relatives who were former puppet soldiers have now taken them to report and ask for permission to study," said the Liberation Press Agency. Thousands of ex-soldiers and civil servants turned up at the local committees in the last week of June, it reported, to take advantage of a second extension of the deadline for registration to the end of June.¹²

Thousands of policemen, soldiers and intelligence agents, however, remained in hiding, in spite of repeated promises of leniency if they voluntarily turned themselves in.¹³ Many soldiers and intelligence agents took refuge in the woods and along rivers, from which they made occasional raids on government patrols and civilian buses to get food, while others hid in the cities.¹⁴ Throughout the summer, official broadcasts told of the capture of small groups of holdouts as well as of individuals who were continuing to hide or resist the new government. In Can Tho province, for example, the population was credited with helping to arrest "many stubborn diehard elements who have conducted secret sabotage activities against the revolution, including five field-rank puppet officers. . . ."¹⁵ Nguyen Huu Tho admitted two months after the end of the war that the new government still had "security problems." He said that the holdouts "cannot do

⁶ "Phong Van Phai Doan CPCMLT" (Interview with the PRG Delegation), *Dat Viet* (Montreal), no. 5 (June 15, 1975), p. 8.

⁷ Saigon Radio, July 29, 1975.

⁸ *Der Spiegel*, June 30, 1975, pp. 64-65.

⁹ The membership of the Military Management Committee was reported on Saigon Radio, May 6, 1975. Although, military management committees were established in each province, it was the Saigon committee that enunciated major policies.

¹⁰ Francois Nivolon, *Le Figaro*, May 24-25, 1975.

¹¹ *Los Angeles Times*, May 12, 1975.

¹² Liberation Press Agency to Vietnam News Agency, July 2, 1975.

¹³ The Military Management Committee said on July 11 that they could still register and would be treated with "clemency" although the deadline had passed. Agence France-Presse dispatch, July 11, 1975.

¹⁴ Associated Press dispatch, *Washington Star*, June 4, 1975.

¹⁵ Liberation Radio, June 10, 1975.

very much, but they try to create disorder. From time to time, for example, individual soldiers are killed; someone throws a hand grenade."¹⁶

Apparently, there was no significant resistance to the revolutionary government in the area formerly governed exclusively by the Hoa Hao, a sect that had traditionally been militantly anti-Communist. A correspondent for the French Communist party newspaper *L'Humanité*, who journeyed deep into Hoa Hao territory in July, reported no signs of any military resistance by the sect.¹⁷ The revolutionary administration in the Hoa Hao area reported arranging for thousands of Hoa Hao believers to attend study sessions on revolution and helping them to join liberation peasants', students' and women's unions.¹⁸

Nevertheless, the population was urged to take an active role in finding and arresting the remnants of the Saigon military apparatus.¹⁹ This mobilization of popular participation in the tracking down of holdouts was an effective substitute for the kind of security precautions, like systematic searches of entire neighborhoods by police, that was commonly practiced under the Thieu regime.

When holdouts did turn themselves in voluntarily, the Lao Dong party's policy of "national reconciliation and concord" called for the use of persuasion to impress on former enemy personnel the evils of the United States war in Vietnam and the justice of the revolutionary struggle. The vehicle for implementing this policy was the "reeducation" or "reform study" course, which all personnel of the old regime were obliged to attend. The format of the course varied, depending on the level of responsibility of the individual in the former government. For the ordinary soldier or civil servant, it was only a three-day course; for non-commissioned officers, the classes lasted a minimum of ten days, and for higher-ranking officers and civilian officials, a minimum of 30 days was required.²⁰

¹⁶ Interview with *Der Spiegel*, quoted in *The New York Times*, July 1, 1975.

¹⁷ Jean-Emile Vidal, *L'Humanité*, July 19, 1975.

¹⁸ Liberation Press Agency to Vietnam News Agency, July 14, 1975.

¹⁹ See *Saigon Giai Phong*, June 4, 1975.

²⁰ James Fenton, *Boston Globe*, August 17, 1975.

²¹ UPI dispatch, *New York News*, August 17, 1975.

²² Some 56,000 unexploded mines, bombs and other explosive devices were reported deactivated in Quang Tri Province in a single month. Vietnam News Agency, July 18, 1975.

²³ Nivolon, *Le Figaro*, June 24, 1975. This was consistent with the position taken by the party during the war. See Porter, "Vietnam: Reconciliation Begins," pp. 601-602.

²⁴ UPI dispatch, *New York News*, August 17, 1975.

²⁵ *Saigon Giai Phong*, June 17, 1975.

²⁶ Nayan Chanda, "Requiem for a New Order," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 6, 1975, p. 14; and "Peace: A Most Treasured Possession," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 25, 1975, p. 24.

Those who had completed the course described the usual day in the life of the "students" as consisting of physical training, political classes, farm work, evening discussion groups and entertainment.²¹ The farm work usually involved clearing fields for cultivation and filling in bomb craters—hazardous duty in view of the amount of unexploded ordnance still lying below the surface of the land in Central Vietnam, but no greater danger than the ordinary peasant faced in trying to cultivate his land.²²

The primary theme of the classes was the crime committed by the United States and its client regime, and although students were required to admit responsibility for their actions in working for the old Saigon government, they were treated as victims of the Americans, and the teachers were careful not to humiliate them.²³ A former major in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), i.e., the South Vietnamese Army, later said that relations between teachers and students in his camp were good.²⁴

Although it noted that "nearly all" of the students admitted that they had "sinned against the people and the revolution," the new government suggested that this was only a first step toward changing political attitudes. *Saigon Liberation* questioned whether most former personnel of the anti-Communist regime had "really made progress" or had merely "pretended to progress merely to get through this phase before returning to society still harboring hostile thoughts against the nation." The true test of their good will, said the paper, would be their willingness to "return to their home lands to perform productive labor" and to "continuously submit themselves to the local people's management."²⁵

The PRG not only carried out its promise of no reprisals against individuals who worked for the former regime but often acted to prevent acts of vengeance by those who had grudges against local policemen and other Saigon officials. In a village in Quang Ngai, local NLF cadres intervened to save the life of a former Saigon security officer who was being beaten by an angry mob. And in another village in the Mekong Delta, after the former police chief and village chief were imprisoned in the local schoolhouse, hundreds of villagers, armed with knives and hatchets, had angrily surrounded the improvised jail to demand their execution, charging them with torture and extortion. The local political cadre succeeded, with some difficulty, in convincing the crowd that "We should not dig up any more hatred, we should rather heal the wounds that remain."²⁶

The new government's efforts to eliminate the vestiges of the United States-sponsored regime also took into account the cultural dimension. Throughout the war, culture had been one of the fronts in the struggle. From the revolutionary viewpoint, certain types of music, books, films and magazines had been

promoted by the United States and the Saigon government in order to separate people from their own traditions of national resistance, to weaken their will to struggle, and to cause them to hate the Communist movement. With the end of the war, therefore, the revolutionary government was determined to get rid of books, magazines, records and tapes that had either explicitly supported the old regime's political viewpoint or had promoted "degenerate lifestyles and mannerisms and nudity."²⁷

One of the government's first moves, therefore, was a "campaign to eliminate decadent and reactionary culture." Unlike the cultural revolution in China, the campaign was not directed against foreign culture generally nor against Vietnam's own "feudalist" culture, but only at the culture that was viewed as having played a "counterrevolutionary" role during the struggle. Students and youth were mobilized to appeal to the population of Saigon by demonstrations, banners and loudspeaker broadcasts to turn in "decadent and reactionary" publications, tapes and records. In the first phase of the campaign, lasting from May 22 to May 31, the youth reportedly collected more than 500,000 publications and more than 26,000 tapes and records.²⁸

THE ECONOMIC CRISIS

The most serious problem facing the new government, however, was not security, or political reeducation, or cultural purification, but recovery from an economic crisis of serious proportions. There were an estimated 1.5 million unemployed at the close of the war, to which were added another 1.5 million soldiers and civil servants of the old government, and another half million who had been economically dependent on the American aid program or the American presence. By some official estimates, as many as 8 million of the nearly 19 million people in the South were either unemployed or doing "unproductive work."²⁹ And the American aid program, which had

been pumping several hundred million dollars worth of goods and salaries into the economy each year, was cut off.

The most urgent task was to provide emergency relief in the form of rice rations for the unemployed. The new government inherited large stocks of imported rice from the United States. But the rice harvest and the preparations for the planting of the fall-winter crop in the highlands and along the central coast were disrupted by the final offensive and the large refugee movements that accompanied it, significantly reducing the total production of rice in the South during 1975.³⁰ North Vietnam had to send large quantities of rice to the South for distribution to the needy in Saigon and other cities. These rice shipments represented a major sacrifice on the part of the population of the North. According to a PRG official, wheat flour, a substitute for rice when rice is scarce, now accounts for 70 percent of the cereals consumed in the North.³¹

Although the assistance in rice from the North did not constitute an abundance of food for the needy in South Vietnam, the Military Management Committee's slogan in distributing food was: "Don't let a single person go hungry."³² The committee distributed a daily rice ration of about 330 grams of rice a day to adults and half that much to children, feeding a total of some 300,000 people in the capital alone.³³

In order to alleviate unemployment and to achieve self-sufficiency in food, the new government had to resettle millions of refugees from the cities in the countryside so that they could resume food production. Instead of using force, the committee provided material incentives for families moving from the cities to the countryside. In addition to free automobile transportation to new rural locations, each member of a family returning received 500 grams of rice and an additional 100 piasters for every day the family was preparing to cultivate the land up to six months or the first harvest.³⁴ Some people went to the relatively underpopulated provinces of Binh Long, Phuoc Long and Long Khanh to clear forest land for rice cultivation, creating "new economic centers" of several thousand people each.³⁵

Urban precincts formed "repatriation motivation
(Continued on page 243)

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²⁷ *Saigon Giai Phong*, May 30, 1975.

²⁸ Liberation Press Agency, June 19, 1975. Those youth who burned books in bonfires, however, exceeded the policy laid down by the Military Management Committee. At a meeting on May 28 in Saigon, the chief of the Information and Culture Commission of the Committee declared, "We have never promoted the burning of books." Saigon Radio, May 30, 1975.

²⁹ Interview with PRG Prime Minister, Huynh Tan Phat by Wilfred Burchett, *The Guardian*, September 24, 1975, p. 141; *Washington Post*, June 19, 1975.

³⁰ *Vietnam Info*, Center of Documentation and Research, Paris, June 26, 1975.

³¹ "Dai Su Dinh Ba Thi Noi Chuyen voi Viet Kieu O Nu Uoc" (Ambassador Dinh Ba Thi Talks with Vietnamese Residents in New York), *Nguoi Viet Doan Ket*, no. 5 (May, 1975), p. 5.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Doan Ket* (Paris), June 7, 1975.

³⁴ *Tin Sang*, September 4, 1975.

³⁵ Vietnam News Agency, August 16, 1975.

“... in the new climate of détente, Indonesia may be trying to accommodate herself to the other new order in Southeast Asia.”

Indonesia and the Changing Order in Asia

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COMMENTATORS on current events in Indonesia too often compare the old and the new in that country's politics, taking the dramatic upheaval that took place in late 1965 and early 1966 as the dividing line. Comparisons between the two Presidents of the island republic have been particularly popular. Sukarno has been described as the “politician par excellence,” a “flamboyant orator,” exuding “brilliance” and “charisma”; he is said to have been an emotional man, thrilled and enthralled by the Revolution, so much so that he wanted it to be an ongoing struggle. Against him, one finds the new President, Suharto, whose lack of flair borders on awkwardness, a low-profile President, wary of headlines and the publicity that his predecessor so eagerly sought. He is said to be dull in mannerisms,

almost soporific in speech, in sum, the anti-hero's hero.¹

Suharto's unexpected entrance in the arena of Indonesian politics caused a subtle but unmistakable de-emphasis of drama.² The durability of his administration can no longer be disputed. Indeed, he has now been in power about half as long as his predecessor. A large part of the past has suffered an eclipse. New forces have come into being, the most prominent among them ORBA itself. The acronym stands for *New Order*, and represents a philosophy that has turned away from the revolutionary ideology espoused by Sukarno. An era has come to an end, and with it ended the procession of promises that had sapped the credibility of both the revolution and *Merdeka*.³

It would be tempting to think that the pattern has settled, that Indonesia has joined “the establishment,” and that ORBA represents only a syndicate of technocrats who—aided and perhaps guided by international capital—endeavor to salvage the ship of state.⁴ This picture is overdrawn, although there is continuity; continuity, in fact, is the hallmark of Indonesian politics.

Most important among the remnants of the past is the Pancasila, the “five principles of state” ideology that Sukarno enunciated early in his regime.⁵ Although he is not usually oriented toward ideological concepts, Suharto is known to revere the five principles. He frequently refers to the Pancasila in public utterances, indeed even when it does not seem relevant. He recently emphasized that the “Pancasila should not merely be the property of the people but should also be understood and adhered to.”⁶ This bedrock of Indonesianism, which, according to its author, contains “the essence of the Indonesian spirit,” is an important link with the past.⁷

So is the constitution of 1945, which Sukarno reintroduced in order to smooth the path for his Guided Democracy.⁸ Guided Democracy itself may not have survived structurally, but its spirit is still

¹ O. W. Roeder's biography, *The Smiling General*, will be reedited and published bilingually under the title *Anak Desa/Son of a Peasant*.

² A highly readable account of the dramatic events of the Sukarno regime is John Hughes, *Indonesian Upheaval* (New York: David McKay Company), 1967, which won the 1967 Pulitzer Prize for foreign reporting. Francoise Cayrac-Blanchard, *Le Parti Communiste Indonésien* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1973) contains an interesting chapter on the coup and its aftermath.

³ *Merdeka* is one of Indonesia's oldest newspapers.

⁴ The amount of international capital that has been applied to get Indonesia on its feet again is prodigious. For an interesting survey of oil finances, see Robert Fabrikant, “Production Sharing Contracts in the Indonesian Petroleum Industry,” *Harvard International Law Journal*, vol. 16 (1975), pp. 303–350.

⁵ Bernhard Dahm, *History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Praeger, 1971) discusses the Pancasila in detail.

⁶ See *Indonesian News and Views*, November 2, 1974. This bulletin is published by the Information Section of the Indonesian embassy (Washington, D.C.), and its name will henceforth be abbreviated *INaV*.

⁷ Independence Day speech, August 17, 1956. Cited by John D. Legge, *Sukarno: A Political Biography* (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 184.

⁸ According to Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years of Indonesian Foreign Policy* (The Hague: Mouton, 1973), p. 275, it was General Nasution, a former minister of defense, who initially proposed a return to the 1945 Constitution.

present. One could point to anti-partyism, very explicit in the days of Guided Democracy. As a force, it may be less overt, but it is by no means dead; witness the recent debates on the *Bill on Political Parties and the Functional Group (GOLKAR)*.⁹ Thus far only two parties have been allowed to operate, the *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* (Indonesian Democratic party) and the *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (United Development party). In addition, *GOLKAR* (an acronym for *Golongan Karya*, meaning functional group) aggregates political interests along functional lines. Government-sponsored and -promoted, an umbrella for those who prefer to protect their occupational interests, *GOLKAR* was a clear victor in the 1971 elections. When the minister of justice recently revealed the government's views on the future of party politics, the chief of staff of the order and security command felt obliged to issue an appeal for public order and tranquility.

However interesting the domestic debate may be, it gives little indication of Indonesia's ability to accommodate herself to the new order in Southeast Asia. An appraisal of that ability should naturally concentrate on official statements concerning the dramatic changes resulting from the Communist victories in Indochina. It should also focus on ASEAN, the association Indonesia sponsored in 1967, because many policy statements are made (somewhat deceptively) within the context of this regional organization.¹⁰

INDONESIA AND THE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

It has sometimes been argued that the American

⁹ See *INaV*, February 22, 1975.

¹⁰ It is not necessary to discuss the effect of the independence of Papua New Guinea on public thinking in Indonesia since that new nation has not contributed to the new order in the strict sense (the territory that Indonesians sometimes call East Irian became independent in September, 1975). Portuguese Timor, currently rocked by an upheaval of unprecedented proportions, should also be excluded from consideration. Although there have been claims to have Portuguese Timor included in Indonesia, the official line has always been negative on this point. The Indonesian government is prepared to take over the territory if that is the wish of the people of Portuguese Timor. (See *INaV*, October 19 and December 2, 1974.)

¹¹ G/30/S, an abbreviation from the Indonesian term *Gerakan September Tiga Pulu*.

¹² In the course of which some 80,000 Communists are said to have been killed. See John Hughes, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

¹³ More than 90 percent of all Indonesians adhere to Islam. There are no difficulties within the group. However, there have been tensions and clashes between the Communists and Islam.

¹⁴ NASAKOM, an acronym derived from "nationalism-religion-communism," a concept advanced by Sukarno calling for unity among nationalists, religious people and Communists in Indonesia.

¹⁵ U.S. President Richard Nixon made the statement in Guam, July, 1969, while returning from a visit to Southeast Asia that included Indonesia.

presence in Indochina saved Indonesia from communism, or at least affected the 1965 coup that came to be designated as the September 30 Movement, G 30 S (short for *Gestapu*).¹¹ If the United States had not been involved in fighting communism in a neighboring theater, so the argument goes, Indonesia's determination to resist communism would have sagged at a critical moment. In other words, the swift and decisive victory that the Indonesian military scored should be attributed in large measure to a climate psychologically conditioned by the American containment attempt.

It is true that at the time of the coup the Americans were in the process of building up their strength in Vietnam. However, the theory has its flaws. It does not take into account the widespread horror evoked by the 1965 massacre of the six generals, a horror that was activated and mobilized into rabid anti-communism.¹² It also ignores the sustained tensions that had accumulated over the years in Indonesian society as a result of ethnic and religious animosities.¹³ The theory also tends to minimize the structural alienation suffered by the *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI, Indonesian Communist party) because parties had been removed from the political arena. To be sure, in some ways the PKI benefited from the ban. Its leadership had started to feel overconfident as it looked forward to the introduction of NASAKOM, which would have given communism a place in Indonesian society that it would never have attained as a political party.¹⁴ However, one must bear in mind that the coup and its immediate aftermath revealed that Communist support was considerably weaker than had been commonly assumed. Conceivably, the absence of party politics during the formative years of Guided Democracy had eroded the strength of the PKI.

But whatever the influence of the United States, the new regime watched the Vietnam struggle with a great deal of anxiety and apprehension, although its belief in domino theories may have been minimal. And there can be little doubt that Indonesia's leaders were disappointed at the successive steps that reflected a diminishing interest on the part of the United States. President Lyndon Baines Johnson's announcement that he would not serve a second term amounted to an oblique admission that the American policy of containment had failed. The Nixon Doctrine, enunciated shortly after President Richard Nixon's visit to Indonesia,¹⁵ had made it much harder to discern when the United States would come to the rescue of a nation to which it was not formally committed by treaty.

Of greater concern was the rapid reduction of United States forces before any peace agreement had been concluded in Indochina. The deescalation played havoc with a calculated and consistent Vietnamiza-

tion program. As a term, Vietnamization had a somewhat paternal if not derogatory undertone, and it is doubtful that any Asian nation put much store in the American attempt to make South Vietnam ready to defend herself. Discarding its ideological aspects, the Vietnam situation revealed a striking similarity with the Dutch-Indonesian skirmishes aside from the actual battlefields. The Dutch, too, had tried to win the hearts and minds of the people. At the same time, they had hurriedly erected a government structure of sorts that hopefully would withstand the forces of nationalism. One remembers only too well that the Dutch-built federation collapsed within six or seven months after the Transfer of Sovereignty, and that the original Republic of Indonesia that had initiated the Revolution became the dominant force in the new Indonesia.¹⁶ Bearing in mind their own experiences, many Indonesians could have predicted the outcome of the war in Indochina.

Even before the Americans withdrew their human resources, Indonesia decided to take an important initiative. The initiative concerned the "aggravating situation in Cambodia," and tried to involve some 20 countries in efforts to prevent the war in Vietnam and Laos from expanding to Cambodia. Only 10 countries (all oriented toward the United States or toward the non-Communist world in general) accepted Indonesia's invitation and participated in the Conference of Foreign Ministers, held in Djakarta on May 16 and 17, 1970. The five years after G 30 S had apparently furthered the right-of-center and conservative image that the counter-coup had given Indonesia, in spite of the regime's continuing emphasis on its "active and independent foreign policy." As a consequence, the conference failed. It is a moot point whether any nation or group of nations would have been able to keep Cambodia out of the war. Undaunted by their lack of success, the foreign ministers expressed the hope that "as a consensus among the Asian nations grows, for which the ideas adopted at the present meeting might be regarded as a starting point, those countries not represented [sic] at the Conference would participate in any future discussions."¹⁷

In addition to reaffirming the commitment of their countries to the principles of the United Nations Charter, the foreign ministers pointed to the Declaration of the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian Nations in April, 1955. They also took note of the

¹⁶ See A. A. Schiller, *The Formation of Federal Indonesia* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1955).

¹⁷ See *Focus on Indonesia* (published by the Information Division of the Embassy of Indonesia), vol. 3, no. 7, September, 1970, p. 9.

¹⁸ The PRG was recognized only as one of the parties in the conflict.

¹⁹ See *INaV*, January 25, 1975.

wish of the Cambodian people to maintain an independent position of neutrality and nonalignment.

The result of this initiative must have been disappointing to the Indonesian government; but the 1973 agreements in Paris to end the Vietnam war were considerably more ominous. These agreements were based on prolonged diplomatic battles between United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, North Vietnam's chief negotiator at the Paris peace talks, both masters in the manipulation of words. Implicit in the agreements was the recognition extended to the People's Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam.¹⁸ Indonesia subsequently offered her services to the International Commission for Control and Supervision. Naturally, such a direct involvement was not without risks (indeed, Canada withdrew from the Commission for that reason), and Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik warned the parties involved in the Vietnam crisis that the Indonesian force would be withdrawn if Indonesian lives continued to be endangered.¹⁹

The Indonesian government nonetheless displayed inordinate self-restraint. At no time did it make any statement that would identify it as an enemy of the Communist regime. (This is the more remarkable since Indonesia had recently suffered through the nightmare that attended her disentanglement from communism.) But the Suharto administration drew the line when it came to recognizing the People's Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, despite the fact that Indonesia's role in the International Commission caused her to deal with the PRG from time to time. Fortunately, international law has become very flexible in matters of recognition, as evidenced by the Soviet Union's recognition of both the Khmer Republic (headed by Lon Nol) and the Royal Government of the National Union of Cambodia (headed by Sihanouk) during the period between 1970 and 1975.

As for Cambodia, Prince Sihanouk, long regarded as the living Cambodian symbol of nonalignment, apparently evoked mixed feelings on the part of the Indonesian political elite. Some remembered his nonalignment posture and his participation in the Bandung Conference; others were upset by his playboy image, and his consequent resemblance to Sukarno. His residence in China, moreover, may not have gone down well with the government. However that may be, recognition was not extended to the Sihanouk government-in-exile, and Indonesia preferred to ignore the groundswell among third world countries in favor of recognizing Sihanouk, and ignored the delegations that the prince-in-exile sent to the spectacular meetings of the nonaligned world. In this position, Indonesia was usually supported by her neighbor, Malaysia.

On the other hand, Foreign Minister Adam Malik

was pleased to note in a televised interview in August, 1973, that Cambodian President Lon Nol appeared prepared "to negotiate with all parties involved including Sihanouk."²⁰ And when the wars in Indochina approached their conclusion, the Indonesian government's attitude reflected almost imperceptible changes. Thus on April 4, 1975 (less than two weeks before the fall of Phnom Penh), Malik declared that "it has become Indonesia's principle not to interfere in the internal affairs of Cambodia." As far as South Vietnam was concerned, when a last-minute envoy from that besieged country arrived in Jakarta, Malik again said explicitly that Indonesia would not participate in an effort to find a peaceful solution to the war.

After the war in Indochina ended, the official emphasis was on peace. In July, 1975, sharing the stage with Yugoslav President Josip Broz-Tito during his visit to Yugoslavia, Suharto expressed satisfaction at the end of the war. Foreign Minister Adam Malik also expressed hope that "after the recent events the people of Vietnam would finally find peace."²¹

Neither spokesman commented on *how* the war had ended, who had won, or, more particularly, whether Indonesia regretted these developments, or whether the recent events might adversely affect Indonesia's position. Nor was any attempt made to assess the ideological impact of the American defeat.

The press in general was less inhibited. *Berita Yudha* thus argued that "although Indonesia is *anti-Communist* (emphasis added) she could adapt herself to the principle whereby she could live with various political systems." In another issue, this daily obliquely criticized the government, claiming that "with the new clarity in regard to the configuration of power, our foreign policy should be more mature, and free from prejudice." Two newspapers believed

that the time had come to moralize. "The moral of Cambodia," according to *Kompas*, "was that subversion could not be fought without paying attention to the socio-economic structure," a point that was supported by *Pos Sore*. As could be expected, a hard line occasionally surfaced. In connection with the security measures that Thailand adopted (largely at the border she shared with Cambodia), the *Berita Buana* saw fit to observe that "Communists should not be dealt with gently." Recognition of the new governments was frequently discussed; in this connection, *Pelita* believed caution and determination were more important than speed.²²

Over the past ten years, public opinion in Indonesia has been ill prepared for important policy shifts. Nevertheless, Indonesia will have to adapt herself to the new situation, which will probably include a restoration of the long-suspended diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China.

In a recent article, a knowledgeable American observer found Indonesia "in many ways, the most disappointing nation in the area."²³ It is true that his arguments largely focus on the domestic scene where *Rèpelita* (the five year plan)²⁴ and Pertamina (the state-operated oil corporation)²⁵ both reveal a degree of misdirection and mismanagement. With some qualifications, one may apply that evaluation to Indonesia's foreign policy as well. Nor should the military establishment be blamed. That establishment has never been military in the Latin American sense;²⁶ indeed, it has included men who had had only intermittently military careers. In Indonesia, the "demilitarization of government" has actually strengthened the conservative outlook. That factor is bound to condition ORBA's response to the peace in Southeast Asia.

One of the interesting political phenomena of the past decade is the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It closely followed a similar but abortive attempt to form a regional organization in the area. The Bangkok Declarations, which founded the association, constitute an important landmark in the history of Southeast Asia and, indeed, in the history of the developing world. What ASEAN has achieved thus far is less significant than the fact that nations that attained independence in the relatively recent past were prepared to forfeit (at least in theory) part of that independence for the sake of regional cooperation.

Nonetheless, ASEAN as a bloc is not actually non-

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²⁰ See *INaV*, August, 1973.

²¹ See Gadis Rasid, "Indochina en de ASEAN landen" (Indochina and the ASEAN countries), *NRC-Handelsblad*, May 24, 1975.

²² The Information Division of the Indonesian embassy provides Indonesian press opinion on an occasional basis. These quotations derive from undated excerpts published in *INaV*, May 10, 1975.

²³ See *New Yorker* correspondent Robert Shaplen, "South-east Asia—Before and After," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 53, no. 3 (April, 1975).

²⁴ Details of the second five year development plan (1974/75—1978/79) may be found in the English language brochure, entitled *Indonesia Develops—Repelita II*, and published by the Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia.

²⁵ Pertamina has accumulated heavy debts. See the articles by Derek Davies, "Sutowo: Down but not Out," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 30, 1975, and by Dan Goggin, "Indonesia—An Oil Nation Under the Gun," *The New York Times*, June 8, 1975.

²⁶ See Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years of Indonesian Foreign Policy*, p. 275, for the "middle way" that Nasution advocated.

BOOK REVIEWS

ON THE FAR EAST

THE CHINA HANDS. By E. J. KAHN, JR. (New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1975. 337 pages, notes on sources and index, \$12.95.)

In his introduction, John K. Fairbank says of this book: "fascinating for its personal details, an inside account of officers who reported conscientiously and were hounded out of the Foreign Service because China's revolution proceeded as they correctly foresaw it would. Their persecution in the 1950's was one manifestation of . . . the same kind of American policy-insanity that took us through Vietnam on out-of-date assumptions. . . ." The nation's fear of a global Communist offensive intensified in the cold war era. In February, 1950, Senator Joseph McCarthy (R., Wisc.) began his campaign against alleged Communists in the State Department who were working and shaping Department policy; under constant attack from McCarthy and his cohorts, the State Department offered sacrificial lambs to help propitiate the McCarthyites. Most of the China Hands, including John Service and O. Edmund Clubb were the victims of the almost forgotten hysteria of the McCarthy era.

The "China Hands" were a special group in their knowledge of China; career diplomats were not normally assigned to posts there unless they spoke Chinese. As John Fairbank wrote in 1967, "These men were true China specialists and we have no one like them today. . . . In our lifetime we shall never again get this much of a grasp of the Chinese scene."

In 1951, O. Edmund Clubb summed up the dilemma of these officials: "They are criticized for being pro this and anti that, when all they are is pro United States . . . and they have offered certain judgments to the Department of State, which judgments may sometimes be right or . . . wrong." In charge of language training in Peking during the 1930's, Clubb declared: "My function wasn't to further the Chinese Revolution or to stop the Chinese Revolution. . . ."

America's best experts on Chinese affairs, the China Hands were gradually pushed out of the Foreign Service because their judgments of the situation in China did not support the nebulous political beliefs of administration officials. Thus they were held responsible for the fall of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's National government to the Chinese Communists in 1949. It had been the

official United States position that China's National government could not be defeated by the Chinese Communists, and when Chiang's government, defeated, fled to Taiwan, the Foreign Service officers who had predicted the event became not prophets, but scapegoats, with a reputation as the China losers.

The China Hands is a fascinating account of several decades of diplomacy in China and of the men who were involved in it, including John Paton Davies, John S. Service, John Carter Vincent, O. Edmund Clubb, and their associates. Kahn has outlined the conflicts between the career diplomats and the State Department's political appointees, who seemed to guide American foreign policy with less than omnipotent wisdom.

He makes a persuasive case for those he writes about. John Service was eventually restored to duty but rusticated in unimportant posts until he retired. O. Edmund Clubb was cleared of charges against him and put out to pasture in the Division of Historical Research (hardly the post for a Foreign Service Officer First Class), "like some unfortunate suspect of the Middle Ages whose innocence has been established by walking on hot plowshares . . . at once cleared and irremediably crippled." After almost 24 years of service Clubb took the option of early retirement. So did most of the others.

John Service, one of those young Foreign Service officers, suggested in 1971 that if the United States had realized that it was Chiang who lost China to Mao Tse-tung, and that China was not ours to lose, it might have been possible to have avoided the Korean War; "Mao's China, having come to power in a different way and not thrust into isolation by a hostile West, might be a different place."

Even today, after the initiation of friendlier relations with Mao's China, there are those who distrust the China Hands; the influence of the McCarthy era on American diplomacy has not yet ended. Kahn makes a telling comment about changeable American diplomacy in a postscript quoting *The New York Times* of August 25, 1974. During the election campaign of 1960, the issue of whether to defend Quemoy and Matsu islands for Chiang Kai-shek had been a substantive issue. "Quemoy and Matsu are not likely to be remembered in history among the outposts of the free world, but there was a time when it was a matter

of grave policy whether the United States would defend the islands. . . . Indeed, Quemoy and Matsu were a major issue of the 1960 Presidential Campaign. . . . Asked [in August, 1974] what the present United States policy on Quemoy and Matsu was, a State Department spokesman said he didn't know but suspected there wasn't any."

Recently, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has defended the right of the State Department to deny testimony to a Senate committee investigating U.S. policy in Cyprus, on the ground that a State Department officer could not be held responsible for an opinion that was later proved wrong. He agreed to supply complete summaries of State Department foreign policy deliberations, but without the names of the officers making the recommendations; he explained that it was essential that an officer should be able to make recommendations without fear of subsequent scrutiny.

Unfortunately, in the Communist-baiting atmosphere of the 1950's, the State Department did not defend its bright young men, and failed to correct the diplomatic record later. O.E.S.

UNFORGETTABLE MONTHS AND YEARS.

BY VO NGUYEN GIAP. TRANSLATED BY MAI VAN ELLIOTT. (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1975. 103 pages, \$6.50, paper.)

The Southeast Asia Program at the University of Cornell has performed a real service in the translation and publication of this memoir of an important period in the life of General Vo Nguyen Giap, best known as the architect of North Vietnamese victories over the French at Dien Bien Phu and in the most recent Vietnamese war.

Giap was politically astute, and the short period of less than a year covered by this memoir is that period when he formulated the political and strategic tactics that were to make him so successful later. It was during the seven months following the Vietminh revolution of 1945 that North Vietnam's eventual leaders started on the road that was to lead them to victory and to cause so much heartache for so many Americans. The translator's introduction offers an excellent background for the events Giap describes and sets them in perspective. O.E.S.

THE COMMUNIST INSURRECTION IN MALAYA: 1948-1960.

BY ANTHONY SHORT. (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1975. 546 pages, bibliography and index, \$21.75.)

Anthony Short has researched this book for eight years, with unrestricted access to Malayan government files. His work deals with the Communist insurrection in Malaya and the steps the govern-

ment took to combat Chinese Communist influence. Publication of the book was delayed for three years because the government of Malaysia never agreed to clear the first three chapters, and one publisher consequently decided not to issue the book.

O.E.S.

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE NEW STATES. BY MICHAEL LEIFER. (New York: Longman Inc., 1975. 114 pages, bibliography and index, \$8.50, cloth; \$3.50, paper.)

Michael Leifer describes the course of independence and the development of the foreign relations of the 10 Southeast Asian nations since the end of World War II. He describes the relations of the states with their former colonial masters, their newer foreign policy alignments, and their attempts to cooperate regionally. He concludes that the major contribution the new states of Southeast Asia "can make to a regional order will be to show themselves capable of overcoming an internal debility which has been their common characteristic since independence." O.E.S.

NEITHER PEACE NOR HONOR. BY ROBERT L. GALLUCCI. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975. 186 pages, bibliography and notes, \$10.00 cloth; \$2.95 paper.)

Robert Gallucci does not agree with two interpretations of our involvement in Vietnam, that we gradually sank into the situation or that we deliberately involved ourselves, i.e., jumped in all by ourselves. He feels that all sorts of mistakes were made and that by a careful study of American involvement in Vietnam we may be able to control foreign policy in the future, if we are willing to be extremely pessimistic with regard to the limited use of force as an instrument of foreign policy.

O.E.S.

POLITICS AND MODERNIZATION IN SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. EDITED BY ROBERT N. KEARNEY. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975. 277 pages, bibliographies and map, \$15.00 cloth; \$6.50 paper.)

This is a fine survey volume which can readily be used in the classroom. In his overview of South and Southeast Asia, the editor lays out the basic economic, social and political facts. Following are chapters on individual countries: India by Stanley A. Kochanek, Pakistan and Bangladesh by Robert LaPorte, Jr., Malaysia by Gordon P. Means, Thailand by Clark D. Neher, Indonesia by Allan A. Samson.

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MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE

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policy, it is apparent that diplomatic relations with China will not solve all of the insurgency problems faced by the non-Communist states of Southeast Asia.

Singapore has approached the recognition of China with considerable caution. Foreign Minister Rajaratnam led a high level delegation to China in March, 1975, and Lee Kuan Yew has repeatedly said that diplomatic relations will be established eventually. But there is no rush to follow the lead of Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Moreover, there is no indication that the Singapore timetable has been altered by the American defeat in Indochina. Singapore has little to gain from a formal association with China, and in Lee's view she probably has much to lose. Some observers feel that a Singapore identity is finally beginning to emerge,¹⁴ and this identity might be threatened by a renascent Chinese chauvinism that might well accompany any increased contact with the mainland. The Singapore strategy has been to buy time for the identity process to develop, and the American withdrawal has done nothing to alter this strategy.

In fact, some seven months after the fall of Saigon there is little apparent change in the foreign policies of Malaysia and Singapore. Malaysia is still pursuing her scheme for the neutralization of Southeast Asia, while Singapore stands aside, assenting but skeptical. Lee Kuan Yew's strategy for survival still requires the active involvement in Southeast Asia of all the major powers, and the United States continues to reassure him that, Vietnam aside, the United States is prepared to remain involved. Bangkok has quieted down following the trauma of the American withdrawal from Indochina, and President Marcos moderated his anti-United States tone considerably after his visit to Peking in June. Perhaps the most serious danger facing both Malaysia and Singapore immediately after the American withdrawal was that leaders in Thailand and the Philippines might begin to believe their own statements. But there is now considerable evidence that they have come to doubt the messages as much as did most outside observers.

The dust has not yet settled in Singapore and Malaysia, of course, and much still depends on the course taken by their northern neighbor, Thailand. However, after some six months' experience, there seems to be good reason to face the future with confidence. Malaysia and Singapore, in their own ways, have weathered the storms of a continuing oil crisis, inflation, recession, and a traumatic end to the third Indo-

china war. The United States is still present in the area, and public demands for total withdrawal have not been forthcoming. Thailand, while insisting that the Americans leave, has left the door open for a continuing relationship. The government of the Philippines seems prepared to compromise on the status of American bases. China has not made any obvious moves to capitalize on Communist victories in Indochina, and each conquering force in the peninsula seems to be working out its problems in its own historical and cultural idiom. On reflection, the "new realities" of Southeast Asia, may be beginning to look surprisingly like the old ones. ■

THE NEW POWER IMBALANCE

(Continued from page 212)

Hanoi and Saigon and Phnom Penh are of an old pattern, not a new one. But an even more definitive gauge of American attitudes toward Southeast Asia is perhaps to be discovered in positions assumed by the United States with respect to neighboring (and related) sectors of strategic concern. When Secretary of State Kissinger, speaking in New York on June 18, 1975, said that "We will maintain our treaty obligations throughout Asia and the Pacific," the words were familiar. And it was a variation of an old refrain when President Ford, toasting President Suharto of Indonesia at Camp David on July 5, 1975, said that "The fact that we had a recent tragedy in Vietnam should redouble our interest, and does, in Southeast Asia."¹² Assurances of the firmness of the American commitment also went to the Philippines. And in mid-April, 1975, Secretary of State Kissinger told Japanese Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa that the United States would honor its defense commitment to Japan "in the event of armed attack against Japan, whether by nuclear or conventional force."¹³ It was the most natural thing in the world—the American world—that both President Ford and Defense Secretary Schlesinger should extravagantly assure South Korea—that other "vital sector" where the United States has labored so long to "contain communism"—of the continuing United States concern for her security.

The American strategic objective in Southeast Asia as in Northeast Asia is still, at the least, a balance of power. At the most, the objective is the overcoming of "communism," the perceived enemy. And the strategy is, as heretofore, primarily military in concept.¹⁴ Other countries, of East and West,

¹² *The New York Times*, July 6, 1975.

¹³ Bernard Gwertzman, *The New York Times*, April 26, 1975.

¹⁴ See in this general connection Drew Middleton, "Pentagon is Reviewing Post-Vietnam Strategy and Judging Views Abroad of U.S. Power," *The New York Times*, July 6, 1975.

¹⁴ Chan Heng Chee, "The New Identity That Is in the Making," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hongkong), August 15, 1975, pp. 6-8.

are adapting their strategies to the changing Asian scene. The United States now subscribes to the principle of détente, and talks of economic "interdependence," but it has thus far proved unable to make an adequate readjustment of its outmoded strategy for Southeast Asia. Thus it remains wedded to a variety of "commitments" to seriously eroded positions, to its "credibility," and to an economic world order that is coming increasingly under challenge.

In Asian circumstances where the cold war patterns have indeed fragmented, but where the United States has still not evolved a new strategy to replace its cold war military strategy, certain tentative forecasts appear in order.

1) The countries of Southeast Asia, at last independent of occidental power, will turn more assiduously to the arduous tasks of achieving political, economic and social change. Despite their potential quarrels and the possibility of new revolutionary turmoil on occasion, they will probably choose in the main to follow the principles and tactics of peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation. In a real sense, there is now a revival of the spirit of "Asia for the Asians," in a more potent form than the concept when China or Japan fostered it for hegemonic ends.

2) Japan is already adjusting her economic strategy to the new conditions in Southeast Asia; and a companion political strategy will naturally follow. The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China will compete with each other for the affections of the countries of Southeast Asia, and the Soviet Union, economically the stronger, will enjoy an initial advantage. China and the Soviet Union will be competing also with the United States, Japan and other capitalist powers for economic advantage and political influence. But given the circumstances, it is not to be anticipated—or feared—that either of these powers will win dominance of the region.

3) The United States suffers from the basic disadvantage of an obsolete strategy. If it continues to be governed by that strategy, its influence in Northeast Asia, East Asia and Southeast Asia will continue to decline. But if the United States revises its strategy to give full play to its great economic power in a spirit of genuine détente, it can achieve substantial national gains, instead of suffering new defeats, in post-Vietnam Southeast Asia. ■

VIETNAM

(Continued from page 235)

committees" to persuade families to participate in the program. Although in some instances inadequate preparations for the returnees caused them to return to the cities in frustration, over two hundred thousand people left Saigon for old and new rice fields in three months. The population of Danang was said to

have been reduced from 800,000 to 400,000 in the first two months alone.³⁶

The revolutionary government not only reaffirmed its respect for private ownership in trade and industry but offered loans to private businesses to help restore production, to purchase machinery abroad and to export handicrafts.³⁷ Factory owners had to submit to the supervision of a committee that included representatives chosen by the workers. Foreign companies, which were encouraged to continue operating, also had supervisory committees, but the committees were ordered to keep their interference to a minimum. The Military Management Committee's Industrial Commission took over factories whose owners had evacuated the country, as in the case of the main steel mill of South Vietnam, Vicasa.³⁸

The cutoff in American-financed imports was a heavy blow to South Vietnamese industry, which had been 85 percent dependent on foreign countries for raw materials and 100 percent dependent on foreign machinery and fuel.³⁹ Although the Soviet Union provided some fuel, it was not sufficient for South Vietnam's needs, and many factories either had to find local substitutes for petroleum and imported raw materials or shut down. Workers did succeed in using local materials and scrap to produce aluminum utensils, nylon fishing nets, textiles, toothpaste, sewing machines and other products.⁴⁰ But at the end of September, 1975, only half the factories were operating, due to raw material shortages.⁴¹

The new government also faced a serious financial crisis. Officials of the National Bank, which closed down for one month to take inventory, found that officials of the former regime who fled the country had stolen or destroyed all of the country's foreign exchange reserves.⁴² Moreover, commercial banks were unable to pay depositors, including private companies, due largely to the thievery of some \$200-million worth of piasters by fleeing bankers.⁴³ As a result, neither government workers nor those in the private sector were paid for the first few weeks. At the end of May, government salaries for civil servants were set at about \$10 per month—considerably below what they had been under the Thieu regime—and most salaries had to be paid in rice.⁴⁴

Moreover, the total amount of economic assistance from socialist countries to Vietnam has been reduced

³⁶ Vietnam News Agency, September 12, 1975; Liberation Radio, August 15, 1975.

³⁷ Interview with the governor of the National Bank, Liberation Press Association, July 1, 1975.

³⁸ *Nhan Dan*, July 28, 1975.

³⁹ Reuter interview with Nguyen Huu Tho, *Washington Post*, August 2, 1975.

⁴⁰ Hanoi Radio, July 14, 1975.

⁴¹ *The Guardian*, September 24, 1975, p. 14.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ UPI dispatch, *Chicago Daily News*, June 30, 1975.

⁴⁴ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 6, 1975, pp. 14–15.

since the end of the war, despite the fact that the economic needs of the country are now far greater because of the United States aid cutoff. "Two will have to live on what supported one," one official in the North observed, meaning that the North now had to divert far more of its limited capital to the South.⁴⁵

The five year plan previously drafted for North Vietnam was redrafted to take into account the South's needs, according to Vietnamese officials in Europe. Much of the capital investment previously planned for agriculture in the North, they report, will now go to the South, where more dramatic results in increased yield can be expected. For the time being, that means higher prices for food and other basic goods in the North. But in 1976, it is expected that the South will produce a food surplus, which can then begin to relieve the North's food deficit, and free capital for industrial investment.

But more sacrifice by the people of North Vietnam is not enough by itself to lift South Vietnam out of its economic crisis. Vietnam, both North and South, is eager to obtain more capital, either in the form of foreign assistance from friendly governments or of investment by foreign companies in Vietnamese resources. The most promising area in this regard is the offshore oil for which several foreign oil companies had begun to prospect under the Thieu regime. The PRG let it be known immediately after its victory that it was interested in renegotiating the oil leases with the companies that had held them under the old regime, and that its terms would be liberal enough to attract the companies' interests.⁴⁶

Thus the Vietnamese leaders have a major, concrete stake in the normalization of relations with the United States government. The United States remains the stumbling block to the exploration of offshore Vietnamese oilfields because of its trade embargo against the two Vietnams. In addition, Vietnamese leaders have not yet given up hope that some reconstruction assistance promised by the United States in the Paris Agreement of 1973 might yet be forthcoming from the United States as part of an overall arrangement establishing a new relationship between the United States and Vietnam.⁴⁷

Vietnam's future international orientation will clearly be shaped in large part by her immediate as

well as her longer-term economic needs, particularly her economic relations with the United States and other nonsocialist countries. In this context, the often-repeated characterization of postwar Vietnam as an outpost of Soviet influence in Southeast Asia (with the prospect of a Soviet naval base at Cam Ranh Bay in the South) is misleading and inaccurate. As North Vietnamese officials have pointed out—and as Chinese officials in Moscow concede privately—a Soviet military base in Vietnam would so violate the Vietnamese definition of independence that it would be unthinkable.⁴⁸ The Vietnamese have for years demonstrated that they can avoid being used by either Moscow or Peking against the other. Today they want to balance their economic and political ties with the socialist states with mutually profitable relations with the United States. ■

THAILAND

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rassment than a safeguard; he thus continued to demand that all American troops be withdrawn within a year. The United States government was still hoping, apparently, for some type of continuing presence in the country, if at a greatly reduced level.²² Kukrit was sitting on a shaky pedestal; he himself warned of a military coup should public objections continue to be so loud and disruptive.²³

In terms of superpower competition for influence, the withdrawal of the United States military does not portend a return to isolation and disinterest in Southeast Asia. American investments remain large especially in Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. The United States must learn to compete at a civilian level and should expect Russia and China to do likewise. This should not be an unmanageable diplomatic task. It certainly is not an unmanageable economic task: American investment potential, both public and private, is still the strongest in the world. The United States must not be driven to withdraw from Southeast Asia because of its political failures there; this would leave the arena of political competition in that area to China, the Soviet Union, and Japan.

The military remains the power behind the throne of Thailand; it is the greatest single agglomeration of disciplined power in a society that is almost coming loose at the seams—superficially—because of the proliferation of organizations making suggestions to settle

⁴⁵ Agence France-Presse, Hanoi, May 23, 1975.

⁴⁶ *Washington Post*, May 3, 1975.

⁴⁷ It is worth recalling that in April, 1973, the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam had reached an accord on a draft agreement concerning United States reconstruction aid to North Vietnam—an agreement which the United States then refused to sign unless certain political conditions were fulfilled. See *Washington Post*, August 3, 1973.

⁴⁸ See Nayan Chanda, "A Prevailing Mood of Confidence," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 8, 1975, p. 21; and Miles Hanley, "A Feeling of Smugness in the Kremlin," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 3, 1975, p. 19.

²² Note the extensive report by Joseph Lelyveld, *The New York Times*, June 29, 1975, especially with regard to government postures and attitudes in the United States and Thailand.

²³ Henry Stockwin, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 8, 1975.

Thai problems, internal and external. Nor have the events of October, 1973, led to legal or constitutional changes of any significance. A real change of emphasis from that of crude military police domination to the preservation of tradition and class advantage through legislation is, however, an observable fact.

It can be predicted that the Kukrit government has the wisdom to control a brittle and deteriorating economic situation—shared by all the nations of the world—while at the same time strengthening ASEAN. It will also have the wisdom to enlist public opinion, among Marxists and non-Marxists, to make sure that the July 1, 1975, promises of Chou En-lai and Teng Chiao-ping will be difficult for the Chinese to ignore. ■

CONSOLIDATING THE CAMBODIAN REVOLUTION

(Continued from page 222)

In addition, August negotiations with the South Vietnamese government secured the return of the Wai Islands to Cambodia. These are important steps in consolidating the revolution. Among Asians, Khmer desires for peace and respect have been recognized and reciprocated. Prince Sihanouk's role in the Revolution is greatly affected by continuing foreign policy crisis management by the Khmer army and the Cabinet. Since his visit to Phnom Penh, mass media speculation about Sihanouk's inactivity places too much emphasis on his ideological differences with the Khmer Marxists. To some extent, his fate as well as the direction of the Revolution itself depends upon United States and French abandonment of cold war orthodoxy and the extension of détente to a country which has had enough of war. ■

INDONESIA

(Continued from page 239)

aligned. It is not only non-Communist; it is also anti-Communist in its orientation. This might be expected. Two of its members, Thailand and the Philippines, are members of SEATO, an organization explicitly estab-

lished to serve as a barrier against communism.²⁷ The current status of SEATO is not important; the bilateral treaties these two nations have with the United States preclude nonalignment in the strict sense. The national psyches of two other partners still bear the scars of recent experiences with communism. In one case, Indonesia, that experience took some 12 years; in the other, Malaysia, the toll in human lives was excessive. Singapore, the fifth and last of the nations that make up ASEAN (in the past occasionally identified as "the Third China"), has from the moment she became independent (less than two months before the Communist coup erupted in her southern neighbor) nursed a mortal fear of communism. In this context, one would hardly expect Adam Malik to contend that the new forces in Indochina that might be ideologically different from ASEAN could cooperate and even join ASEAN.²⁸

ASEAN may yet develop defensive overtones. The prolonged death struggle of SEATO and the advance of communism may make a defensive regional alliance more attractive. Extraordinary efforts are being made (indeed, the Indonesian government on occasions bends over backward) to deny such a possibility. But joint maneuvers in the area occur with increased frequency. It is true that these are held under the auspices of individual member states, and not within the context of ASEAN.²⁹ When, in a recent interview, Foreign Minister Adam Malik was asked to describe the nature and aims of ASEAN, he replied that the Bangkok Declarations elaborated "the common interests of its members," and then added somewhat awkwardly: "Since the beginning, ASEAN members realized that it was not easy to formulate these common interests because they varied for each country."³⁰ This general description is not very satisfactory. But the main point is that the five ASEAN nations, apprehensive about the implications of the Nixon Doctrine and alerted by the recent Communist advance, may well find it in their "common interest" to undertake military cooperation.

This contingency may be slow in coming. Counterforces are also at work. Shortly after the fall of the Khmer Republic and the Republic of South Vietnam, a conference was held at Kuala Lumpur to establish a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality.³¹ A precondition of such an arrangement would be that nations would have to remove foreign military establishments from their soil. Another factor that could cause some delay is the "second cold war," as the simmering rift between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China has been labeled. Tension between China and the Soviet Union may well become an incisive force in world politics, particularly in the politics of the developing world. It surfaced in August, 1975, when the Soviet Union requested the

(Continued on page 256)

²⁷ An American clause to the effect that the treaty provisions become operative only in case of a Communist attack makes this clear.

²⁸ See *INaV*, May 3, 1975.

²⁹ For the joint Malaysian-Indonesian maneuvers (code named *Malindo*), see *INaV*, September 10, 1974.

³⁰ See *INaV*, August, 1973. The lack of commonality may be ASEAN's greatest handicap. See also Michael Leifer, "The ASEAN States: No Common Outlook," *International Affairs* (London), October, 1973.

³¹ Most observers agree that the Kuala Lumpur Conference did not achieve very much, and that the idea of a "zone of peace, freedom and neutrality" is bound to remain a mirage.

FROM FEUDALISM TO COMMUNISM IN LAOS

(Continued from page 226)

thing is that it was only cut down to size. Vientiane is the only Indochinese capital today in which the United States has any diplomatic mission at all. In June, 1975, the Communists forced the termination of the huge AID mission, the symbol of the American domination of Laotian political and economic life for more than a decade at the very considerable cost to the country of \$30 million a year. There is still great bitterness among the Pathet Lao leaders toward the United States because of the support it gave to the anti-Communist cause, which prolonged the Laotian war at least a decade. On the other hand, Laos is almost literally broke, with nowhere near the natural resources, infrastructure, or human skills of North or South Vietnam. Laos needs American—or other—financial resources badly, and she probably needs more resources than the Communist powers would like to supply. If Laos can get such help without political strings, there is no doubt that the present Communist leadership will take it, barring moves on the part of the United States, the other Indochinese states, the Soviet Union, or China that would make the receipt of such aid embarrassing.

UNITED STATES NEEDS

For its part, the United States badly wants an Indochinese presence—though few officials in the American foreign affairs establishment seem to be able to explain exactly why such a presence is required. Some say that it provides a window on the rest of Indochina,¹² but Vientiane was never a very good place for following developments in Vietnam and Cambodia. In any event, the United States may be willing to provide modest levels of economic assistance, its own economy permitting. But it seems unlikely that there will ever again be the level of common identity that characterized the relationship between Washington and the former Laotian elite in the middle and late 1960's. Moreover, Laos is not—and never was—all that important to the United States, and there is no reason for a strong relationship between the two countries.

Much more crucial to the new Laotian leadership will be its relationship with the two major Communist powers, the Soviet Union and China, and the Vietnamese Communists, who played such a key role in bringing the Pathet Lao to power. Of the Com-

munist great powers, the Soviets clearly have the larger presence in Laos today, with no less than 1,500 technicians at work on projects of various kinds.¹³ The Soviet Union is the more influential of the two major Communist states in Hanoi, too, which may mean that Laos, in time, will choose to side with China to help Laos maintain her independence from the Communist Vietnamese (as the Cambodians have already done).

The People's Republic of China clearly means to have the maximum influence it can in Vientiane, and its supply of rice to Laos in the present difficult period is an indication of this intention. The Chinese, moreover, share a border with Laos and have built roads from their own frontier across the northern part of the country in recent years. There will surely be limits to the extent to which Laos can free herself from Chinese influence, even if she wants to do so. In the long run, the impact of the People's Republic of China is likely to be much greater than that of the Soviet Union.

LAOS AND VIETNAM

The bigger question mark concerns the Communist Vietnamese, whether they are reunited or divided into two states, as they are likely to be for some time to come. There are still North Vietnamese troops in the eastern part of Laos, and it is open to question whether they will soon completely leave the country. Cambodia clearly has chosen to keep Vietnamese influence to a minimum and has sought Chinese friendship toward this end. There is no evidence as yet that Vientiane's new rulers feel as strongly on this question, but for the most part they have been preoccupied in the last half-year in establishing their rule in the country.

At this time, there is no evidence that North Vietnam wants any more from Laos than political friendship and an alliance in intraregional politics. The Communist Vietnamese have taken an enlightened attitude toward the internal autonomy of their own minorities, and any Vietnamese effort to dominate Laos would surely set off an anti-Vietnamese reaction. The intentions of Hanoi—or Vientiane—toward Thailand, for example, are by no means clear, nor is it apparent that their policies toward that mainland Southeast Asian country have even been decided.¹⁴ At most, Vientiane and Hanoi will probably cooperate—possibly in an adversary role—vis-à-vis Thailand in the years ahead. But it is doubtful that the Vietnamese will be able to manipulate the Laotians to do anything that they themselves do not want to do or anything that is not in their discernible interest, given the growing national consciousness that is a major part of the coming-to-power of the Laotian Communists.

¹² See David A. Andelman, "Why U.S. Stays in Laos," *The New York Times*, June 7, 1975.

¹³ *The Washington Post*, August 29, 1975.

¹⁴ A good analysis is provided by Daniel Southerland in "Laos Likely to Follow Its Own Communist Style," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 27, 1975.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of October, 1975, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

European Economic Community (EEC)

(See *Portugal*)

International Court of Justice (World Court)

(See *Morocco*)

Middle East

(See also *Intl, U.N.; Egypt; Israel; U.S., Legislation*)

Oct. 16—At the end of a 2-day meeting in Cairo, 18 of the members of the Arab League (with Syria, Libya and the Palestine Liberation Organization boycotting the meeting) warn Israel not to take advantage of the internal strife in Lebanon.

United Nations

(See also *Comoro Islands; Egypt; Morocco*)

Oct. 1—In a message delivered in Ugandan President Idi Amin's presence to the United Nations General Assembly by Uganda's chief U.N. delegate, Khalid Younis Kinene, Amin calls for the "extinction of Israel as a state"; he asks the American people to "rid their society of the Zionists."

Oct. 3—Chief United States delegate to the U.N. Daniel P. Moynihan uses the term "racist murderer" to describe Uganda's President Idi Amin, in a speech in San Francisco.

Oct. 6—Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia addresses the General Assembly.

Oct. 9—24 days of general debate end at the U.N.

Oct. 10—The 42 countries of the Islamic Conference are given permanent observer status in the U.N.

Oct. 20—The director general of UNESCO says that the U.S. must pay its 25 percent share of the agency's budget; the U.S. has withheld its \$19.8-million payment because of UNESCO's discrimination against Israel.

Oct. 23—By a 13-0 vote, with 2 abstentions, the Security Council extends for one year the U.N. peace-keeping mandate in the Sinai buffer zone.

ARGENTINA

Oct. 17—In Buenos Aires, in her first public address since she returned from a month-long leave of absence, President Isabel Martínez de Perón pledges to remain in office.

Oct. 25—Union leaders agree to abide by Perón's proposed program of October 24 to fight inflation and prevent labor anarchy.

AUSTRALIA

Oct. 14—Minister for Minerals and Energy Reginald F. X. Connor resigns from the Cabinet. Connor was recently involved in a government attempt to obtain secretly an \$8-million loan from Arab oil countries to develop Australian mineral resources.

Oct. 15—Malcolm Fraser, leader of the opposition party, the Liberal-Country party, demands Prime Minister Gough Whitlam's resignation. Whitlam refuses.

Oct. 16—The Senate rejects the government's annual budget. The opposition party has promised to continue to reject the budget until Whitlam resigns and calls for new elections.

AUSTRIA

(See also *Turkey*)

Oct. 5—Parliamentary elections are held.

Oct. 6—Preliminary election results give Chancellor Bruno Kreisky's Socialist party 1 additional seat in Parliament, bringing its total to 94 seats out of 183.

BANGLADESH

Oct. 3—President Khandaker Moshtaque announces the immediate release of all political prisoners and promises to hold general elections by February, 1977.

CAMBODIA

(See also *Intl, U.N.*)

Oct. 3—Head of State Prince Norodom Sihanouk arrives in New York City. He states that: "... I do not assume the responsibility of government. ... I am not an ambassador. ... Cambodia is ruled by the people and not by the head of state."

Oct. 12—In Peking, aides to Prince Sihanouk report that on his return to Phnom Penh Sihanouk was informed by Cambodian leaders of the fate of members of the defeated government. Premier Long Boret, Lieutenant General Sisowath Sirik Matak, and other military officers were executed by firing squads; General Lon Non, a former interior minister and brother of former President Lon Nol, was reportedly killed by an angry mob.

Oct. 17—In an interview in Hong Kong, Nouth

Cheoum, Prince Sihanouk's former press secretary, says that Prince Sihanouk was "appalled" at the conditions in Phnom Penh. Cheoum is seeking asylum in Europe.

Oct. 28—Deputy Premier Ieng Sary heads an 8-person delegation to Bangkok. The delegation is met at the airport by Thailand's Deputy Premier and Defense Minister General Parwmarn Adireksern and Foreign Minister Chatichai Choonhaven.

CANADA

See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Oct. 14—Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau announces new economic measures to be enforced immediately by the government under its emergency powers. Income guidelines will hold wage increases to between 8 and 12 percent per year; price increases must be matched to rising costs in operating expenses.

CHAD

Oct. 13—At the government's direction, the French government begins withdrawing its troops. The order was given after France disregarded the government's wishes by negotiating directly with the guerrillas who kidnapped and for 18 months have held for ransom a French woman, Françoise Claustre.

CHILE

Oct. 8—In Buenos Aires, Argentina, 12 Chilean refugees seize the offices of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and take 13 hostages. They demand safe conduct to a friendly country.

Oct. 10—The Chileans release their hostages and fly to Algiers.

Oct. 14—A United Nations report accuses the government of operating 11 detention centers where prisoners are held secretly and tortured.

CHINA

Oct. 9—60 Nationalist Chinese prisoners are freed and returned by boat to the Nationalist-held island of Quemoy; 5 are sent to Hong Kong. In September, 1975, the Peking government announced the pending release of 144 Nationalist Chinese prisoners.

Oct. 11—In Peking, Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-ping meets with U.S. diplomat George Bush.

Premier Chou En-lai is reported to be in failing health in a Peking hospital. He has received no foreign visitors in over a month.

Oct. 19—U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger arrives in Peking.

Oct. 23—Kissinger ends his 4-day visit. He says that he found Chairman Mao Tse-tung to be "in full control."

Oct. 30—A provincial radio broadcast reports that, in an unusual move, Wei Kuo-ching, the powerful first secretary of the Chuang Autonomous Region, has been transferred to the post of first secretary of Kwangton Province.

COMORO ISLANDS

Oct. 17—In the U.N., the Security Council votes to recommend admission of the islands to membership.

DAHOMY

Oct. 19—Information Minister Martin Azonhiho reports that government troops have quashed a plot to overthrow the government and reinstate former President Emile-Derlin Zinsou.

ECUADOR

Oct. 12—President Guillermo Rodriguez exiles 8 of the officers accused of taking part in an attempted coup in August. 2 defense lawyers are also exiled.

EGYPT

(See also *Israel*)

Oct. 6—In Cairo, on the 2d anniversary of the 1973 war, a military parade displays fighter planes purchased from France earlier this year.

Oct. 17—After the Syrian air force commander makes statements critical of Egypt's foreign policy, the government withdraws all of its air force stationed in Syria.

Oct. 18—In a speech in Cairo, President Anwar Sadat complains of the increased arms being sold by the U.S. to Israel.

Oct. 26—President Sadat arrives in Washington, D.C., for talks with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and U.S. President Gerald Ford.

Oct. 28—In Washington, D.C., President Sadat urges U.S. President Gerald Ford to begin to communicate with the Palestine Liberation Organization.

President Sadat and President Ford sign 4 agreements—one of which provides for the sale of \$98.1-million worth of wheat, flour and tobacco to Egypt at long-term low interest rates. In another agreement Egypt agrees to exhibit in the U.S. the "Treasures of Tutankhamen."

Oct. 29—In an address to the General Assembly of the U.N., President Sadat asks for the resumption of the Geneva conference on the Middle East.

FINLAND

Oct. 29—President Urho Kekkonen asks former President Martti Miettunen of the Center party to form a new government.

FRANCE

(See also *Chad*)

Oct. 8—In Vientiane, the embassy announces that

the government will withdraw its military mission to Laos by the end of 1975.

Oct. 14—President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing arrives in Moscow for talks with Soviet Communist Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev.

Oct. 20—Minister for Cooperation Pierre Abelin is reelected to Parliament by a 52.6 percent vote.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Oct. 3—In Washington, D.C., Chancellor Helmut Schmidt confers with U.S. President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger about world monetary problems.

GHANA

Oct. 11—The Supreme Military Council replaces the National Redemption Council as the new administrative and legislative body.

ICELAND

Oct. 15—The government extends its fishing limits from 50 miles to 200 miles. Iceland is the 1st European country to claim so wide an area.

INDIA

Oct. 17—A presidential ordinance amending the Internal Security Act is issued. In the future, the government will no longer be obliged to disclose either to the courts or to anyone else the reasons for arrests made under the security act.

INDONESIA

(See *Portuguese Timor*)

ISRAEL

See also *Intl, Middle East, U.N.; Egypt; U.S., Legislation*)

Oct. 10—In Jerusalem, officials sign the protocol of the Sinai accord with Egypt. The ceremony was arranged after the United States Congress voted to approve the use of American technicians in the Sinai.

Simultaneously, the Israelis begin to turn over the oilfields at Sudr to Egyptians.

ITALY

Oct. 1—Premier Aldo Moro announces an agreement with Yugoslavia in which Italy gives up all claim to land south of the city of Trieste. The Parliament must debate and approve the agreement.

Oct. 15—For the first time in 12 years, President Giovanni Leone sends a state-of-the-nation message to Parliament. He expresses his concern over the condition of the country.

KENYA

Oct. 14—In Parliament, 2 members (the deputy

speaker and another member) are arrested at gunpoint and detained because they made comments critical of the government.

Oct. 16—President Jomo Kenyatta warns Parliament that forcible action will be taken against any member who speaks against the government.

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

Oct. 2—President Park Chung Hee sends the 1976 budget bill to the National Assembly for approval. In the bill, he proposes doubling military spending next year.

LAOS

(See also *France*)

Oct. 16—The national police director announces the formation of the Urban Protection Police, comprised of pro-Communist Pathet Lao, to replace the mixed police force of Pathet Lao and non-Communists.

LEBANON

(See also *Intl, Middle East*)

Oct. 1—In Beirut, police report renewed fighting between Muslims and Christians. The city again suspends business activity.

Oct. 3—Security forces station themselves between the quarreling factions after they agree to a ceasefire.

Oct. 9—Heavy fighting breaks out in Beirut. About 25 people are killed when rockets and mortar shells hit a residential district of Beirut.

Oct. 10—Premier Rashid Karami announces that Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasir Arafat will come to Lebanon to try to restore peace.

Oct. 22—2 American government employees are kidnapped by gunmen.

Oct. 26—Heavy fighting rages in Beirut and the suburbs.

Oct. 27—52 people are reported killed as fighting spreads to the downtown hotel district.

Oct. 28—In Beirut, the U.S. embassy advises American dependents and nonessential personnel to leave the country.

Heavy fighting continues around the hotel district.

Oct. 29—Gunmen attack the Parliament building and fire at random in the Chamber of Deputies.

Premier Karami calls for the formation of a 10-man committee of political and factional leaders to remain at the Grand Palace until peace is restored. His plan fails when only 3 political leaders appear.

MAURITANIA

(See *Morocco*)

MOROCCO

Oct. 16—The International Court of Justice rules

that Morocco and Mauritania have historical links to the tribes that were in the Sahara when Spain colonized it in 1884. Spain has promised to restore independence to the area and its 75,000 inhabitants.

King Hassan II urges his people to march into the Spanish Sahara and claim the territory.

Oct. 18—In the U.N., Spain requests an urgent meeting of the Security Council to "dissuade the Moroccan government from undertaking the announced invasion."

Oct. 19—In Rabat, officials claim that 362,000 volunteers have signed up for the march to the Sahara.

Oct. 24—Foreign Minister Ahmed Laraki leaves for Madrid for talks with Spanish officials about the Spanish Sahara dispute.

NIGERIA

Oct. 1—Brigadier General Muritala Rufai Mohammed, the new head of state, promises to return the country to civilian rule by October, 1979.

Oct. 18—Military leaders begin an official campaign against corruption in the government.

NORWAY

Oct. 5—King Olav V arrives in New York City to begin a 26-day visit to the United States.

POLAND

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

PORTUGAL

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Oct. 1—President Francisco da Costa Gomes arrives in Moscow for 3 days of talks with Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny and Soviet Communist Party Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev.

Oct. 5—Foreign Minister Ernesto Melo Antunes leaves for Luxembourg for talks with European Economic Community officials.

Oct. 6—The European Economic Community offers Portugal a \$187-million loan.

Oct. 7—In Oporto, leftist soldiers and civilians take over the artillery barracks. They threaten to remain there until Brigadier General António Pires Veloso withdraws his October 3 order to disband the pro-Communist regiment.

Oct. 13—General Carlos Fabiao, head of the army, agrees to reinstate the leftist soldiers expelled from the transport division of the Oporto regiment.

Oct. 21—New governors for Lisbon, Braga, Faro and Castelo Branco are sworn in. They replace officials aligned with the Popular Democratic Movement.

Oct. 22—In Lisbon, leftist soldiers seize a radio sta-

tion, Rádio Renascença, closed down by the government, and begin broadcasting.

Oct. 24—In Lisbon, 6 bombs explode, reportedly the responsibility of the "extreme right wing."

General Otelio Saraiva de Carvalho puts the troops on a nationwide alert.

Oct. 25—General Carvalho calls off the alert.

Oct. 28—Romanian President Nicolae Ceaucescu arrives in Lisbon. He is the 1st Communist chief of state to visit Portugal since the April, 1974, takeover.

Portuguese Territories PORTUGUESE TIMOR

Oct. 11—Fretilin, the leftist Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor, establishes a transitional administration. Fighting with pro-Indonesian forces on the island continues.

RHODESIA

Oct. 20—Prime Minister Ian D. Smith and 3 Cabinet ministers arrive in Pretoria for talks with South African Prime Minister John Vorster.

ROMANIA

(See *Portugal*)

SAUDI ARABIA

Oct. 13—King Khalid forms a new Cabinet.

SOUTH AFRICA, REPUBLIC OF

(See *Rhodesia*)

SPAIN

(See also *Morocco; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Oct. 1—A few hours before Generalissimo Francisco Franco is to address a crowd in Madrid, gunmen kill 3 policemen and wound a 4th.

Franco addresses the crowd, denouncing the protesters who criticized the government for executing 5 terrorists last month.

Oct. 6—The Cabinet meets in special session to determine measures to take against the Basque terrorists.

Oct. 10—Lieutenant General Angel Campano López is named director general of a new paramilitary civil guard.

Oct. 21—Franco is reported to be gravely ill; his heart condition continues to deteriorate.

Oct. 30—Prince Juan Carlos de Borbón becomes temporary Chief of State at 9 p.m. The 82-year-old Franco is near death.

Oct. 31—Juan Carlos takes charge of his first Cabinet meeting.

SYRIA

(See also *Intl, Middle East; Egypt*)

Oct. 18—President Hafez al-Assad confirms reports

that the Soviet Union will be supplying his country with armaments. He rejects the proposed United States role as mediator for a Syrian-Israeli disengagement on the Golan Heights.

TAIWAN

(See *China*)

THAILAND

(See *Cambodia*)

TURKEY

(See also *U.S., Legislation*)

Oct. 13—Returns from yesterday's elections show the 4-party coalition government of Premier Suleyman Demirel winning 27 of the 54 Senate seats being contested in the 181-seat Senate. The next regular elections are scheduled for 1977.

Oct. 22—In Vienna, Danis Tunaligil, ambassador to Austria, is killed by 3 men armed with machine guns in the embassy building.

Oct. 24—In Paris, Ismail Erez, ambassador to France, is killed by a man firing a machine gun.

UGANDA

(See *Intl., U.N.*)

U.S.S.R.

(See also *France; Portugal; Syria; Vietnam*)

Oct. 7—Soviet and East German officials sign a revised treaty of friendship that no longer calls for the reunification of Germany. This is the 1st treaty revision since the Helsinki conference in July.

Oct. 9—Soviet physicist Andrei D. Sakharov, the developer of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. He has become the Soviet Union's most outspoken advocate for civil liberties. It is not known whether the government will permit him to go to Oslo to receive the prize on December 10.

Oct. 20—In Moscow, Soviet and U.S. officials announce a 5-year grain agreement in which the Soviets agree to buy between 6 million and 8 million tons of U.S. grain over the next 5 years. The U.S. acquires the option of buying 200,000 barrels of oil a day from the Soviet Union at a price that will "assure the interests" of both governments.

Oct. 22—A Soviet unmanned spacecraft lands on Venus and sends photographs of the planet to earth.

Oct. 25—In Moscow, 72 members of the Soviet Academy of Sciences (one-third of its membership) denounce the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Sakharov as "blasphemy against . . . humanism, peace, justice, and friendship."

A 2d unmanned spacecraft lands on Venus and sends photographs back to earth.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Oct. 1—A High Court judge rules that the press may publish the diaries of a former Cabinet official, Richard Crossman, even though the government claims that Cabinet discussions are secret.

Oct. 20—Prime Minister Harold Wilson orders an investigation by a royal commission into the National Health Service.

Oct. 23—In London, a bomb explodes outside the house of Hugh Fraser, an opponent of the IRA, whose house guest is Carolyn Kennedy, the daughter of the late U.S. President John Kennedy. A passer-by is killed.

Oct. 30—In London, a bomb explodes outside a restaurant. 17 people are injured.

Northern Ireland

Oct. 2—In Belfast, 12 people are killed and 40 are wounded in bombings and shootings by members of Ulster's Protestant paramilitary group.

Oct. 3—A Dutch industrialist, Tiede Herrema, is kidnapped and held for ransom by 2 former members of the Irish Republican Army. They demand the release from prison of 2 IRA members.

UNITED STATES

Administration

Oct. 1—Secret Service protection begins today for candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination who have raised more than \$100,000 in campaign contributions in the first half of 1975.

Oct. 6—In a televised speech, President Gerald Ford proposes to make the \$17 billion in antirecession tax cuts enacted last March permanent and to make additional cuts of \$11 billion, tying his support for the measures to a congressional commitment to a \$28-billion reduction in federal spending during the next fiscal year.

Oct. 8—The President says he sees no reason for Congress to enact legislation to "bail out New York City"; the city is suffering from an acute financial crisis and has asked for federal aid. (See also *Economy, Legislation.*)

Oct. 11—Vice President Nelson Rockefeller asks Congress to act to help New York City as soon as the city's mayor and its Emergency Financial Control Board set up a plan to eliminate New York's budget deficit by 1978.

Oct. 14—In Hartford, Connecticut, the President is not injured when his limousine is struck by another car at an intersection. The President's limousine went through a red light at the intersection, where traffic had not been halted to allow the presidential motorcade to proceed.

Oct. 17—The Department of Housing and Urban

Development agrees to release \$264.1 million in impounded funds during the next 2 years. The program's low subsidized interest rate of 5 percent is designed to help families in the \$9,000 to \$11,000 income range to buy new or rehabilitated housing; it is a modification of the original program, whose funds were impounded by the Nixon administration in 1973 because of its cost.

Oct. 28—At the order of United States District Judge Thomas MacBride in Sacramento, California, President Gerald Ford agrees to submit a video-taped deposition of what he saw when Lynette Fromme allegedly pointed a pistol at him September 5 in California's State Capitol Park.

Oct. 29—Officials of the Social Security Administration announce that beginning January 1, 1976, social security taxes will be levied on the first \$15,300 of a wage earner's income; the 1975 taxable wage base is \$14,100. Changes in the taxable wage base are mandated when automatic cost-of-living benefits are increased.

Civil Rights

Oct. 24—A controversial school desegregation plan in Atlanta, Georgia, is upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; the plan calls for jobs for blacks within the school administration in return for the abandonment of massive crosstown busing.

Racially troubled South Boston High School closes as fighting between white and black students breaks out after a week of gathering tension.

Economy

Oct. 1—One of the country's largest retail chains, the W. T. Grant Company, files a petition in voluntary bankruptcy before Bankruptcy Judge John Gallay for the Southern District of New York; the company lists more than \$1 billion in debts. This is the second largest bankruptcy filing in history, exceeded only by the \$3.3 billion in liabilities the Penn Central Transportation Co. made public in 1970.

Oct. 17—Saved by a \$150-million agreement to purchase city bonds issued by the Municipal Assistance Corporation from the pension fund of the teachers' retirement fund, New York City temporarily avoids defaulting on its obligations. (See also *Administration; Legislation*.)

Oct. 20—The Commerce Department reports that the country's total output of goods and services, or GNP, in terms of actual quantity, rose at an annual rate of 11.2 percent during the July-September quarter, the fastest rate in 20 years.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, U.N.; China; Egypt; Germany; Lebanon; Norway; Syria; U.S.S.R.*)

Oct. 4—At the conclusion of 2 weeks of talks in Washington, D.C., and New York, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and Spanish Foreign Minister Pedro Cortina Mauri announce that they have reached an agreement in principle on a new accord for continued U.S. use of Spanish military bases.

Oct. 10—President Ford lifts the embargo on U.S. grain sales to Poland after the U.S. Department of Agriculture releases a new estimate predicting record corn and wheat harvests in the U.S.

Kissinger and the White House announce an emergency \$85-million economic aid package for Portugal as a step in "United States support for the political evolution in Portugal."

Oct. 15—Kissinger confers in Ottawa with Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau and Canadian External Affairs Secretary Allan J. MacEachen; this is Kissinger's first trip to Canada devoted only to Canadian affairs.

In a letter to Congressman Otis Pike (D., N.Y.), chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, Kissinger agrees to provide the committee with full summaries of foreign policy deliberations but will not divulge the names of middle-level State Department officials who made the recommendations.

Oct. 16—The U.S. State Department, in a report to the Senate, says that the U.S. sold Polaris missiles to Britain in 1966 at a reduced price in return for the establishment of a British military base to be shared by the U.S. on Diego Garcia, an island in the Indian Ocean.

Oct. 19—Kissinger arrives in Peking for 4 days of meetings with Chinese officials and to arrange for a visit to China for U.S. President Gerald Ford later this year.

Oct. 20—The 2-month moratorium on further U.S. grain sales to the U.S.S.R. in 1975 is lifted.

Labor and Industry

Oct. 1—Vandals in the pressroom of the *Washington Post* damage all 72 printing units and force the paper to cease publication temporarily; it is alleged that the damage was caused by striking employees.

Oct. 3—The *Washington Post* resumes publication in a limited edition of 24 pages.

The Labor Department reports that the country's unemployment rate went down from 8.4 percent to 8.3 percent in September.

Oct. 16—The Federal Reserve Board reports that industrial production rose 1.9 percent in September. This is the 5th consecutive monthly rise and the biggest advance in a month since November, 1964.

Legislation

Oct. 1—Voting 278 to 123, the House completes congressional action on a 5 percent pay rise for federal

employees, including members of Congress; without congressional action, an 8.66 percent rise would have become effective automatically.

President Ford vetoes a bill increasing price supports on tobacco.

Oct. 3—The President vetoes the \$2.7-billion federal child nutrition bill, saying that the bill provides school lunches for nonneedy children.

By voice vote, the Senate completes congressional action on a measure partially raising the embargo against shipping U.S. arms to Turkey. The bill goes to the White House.

Oct. 7—The House votes 397 to 18 and the Senate votes 79 to 13 to override the President's veto of the \$2.7-billion extension of federal child nutrition and school lunch programs. This is Congress's 8th attempt to override a presidential veto in 1975 and its 3d successful attempt.

Oct. 9—The Senate votes 70 to 18 to approve a congressional resolution that approves the stationing of American civilians in the Sinai to operate early warning stations there. The House approved the resolution yesterday with a vote of 341 to 69.

Oct. 13—The President signs the resolution on stationing American civilians in the Sinai.

Oct. 29—In a speech at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., the President says he is "prepared to veto" any legislation that would guarantee federal funds to save New York City from defaulting on its loans. He has sent Congress a proposed bill to permit the city to maintain police and fire protection and other essential services in the event that it files for bankruptcy. (See also *Administration, Economy*.)

Oct. 31—Kissinger informs the House Select Committee on Intelligence that during his 6 years as a national security adviser to Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford no secret intelligence operations were carried on by the U.S. without presidential approval.

Military

Oct. 19—The United States Navy officially ends the use of the Puerto Rican island of Culebra as a target area after a 5-year fight by residents of the island to have the Navy withdraw.

Oct. 24—In a letter to Senator John McClellan (D., Ark.), Senate Appropriations Committee chairman, Defense Secretary James Schlesinger warns that "by most of the available measures American [military] power is declining and Soviet power is rising"; he urges restoration of Defense Department budget cuts.

Political Scandal

Oct. 1—Armand Hammer, president of the Occidental Petroleum Corp., pleads guilty in a federal

district court in Washington, D.C., to 3 misdemeanor charges of making illegal contributions in the 1972 campaign to reelect President Nixon; the contributions were made in the names of other persons.

Oct. 15—Special Watergate Prosecutor Henry Ruth issues a 277-page report summarizing the results of his investigation.

Oct. 17—Ruth resigns as scheduled; Charles F. Ruff succeeds him.

Political Terrorism

Oct. 27—The Puerto Rican terrorist group, the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional Puertorriquena (FALN) claims responsibility for 9 bomb explosions in New York, Washington, D.C., and Chicago early this morning.

Politics

Oct. 13—Alabama Governor George Wallace arrives in London on the first leg of a 2-week trip to Europe to demonstrate his physical fitness for a campaign for the presidency.

Oct. 15—In Washington, D.C., it is announced that 12 of the current presidential candidates have raised enough funds in private contributions to qualify for federal subsidies to help them in their 1976 primary campaigns.

Oct. 21—Senator Birch Bayh (D., Ind.) announces his candidacy for the Democratic presidential nomination.

Oct. 31—David Packard resigns as chairman of the President's 1976 campaign finance committee.

Supreme Court

Oct. 6—The Supreme Court opens its new court year.

VIETNAM

Oct. 22—The government notifies the correspondent of *Yomiri Saimbun*, one of Japan's major newspapers, to leave Saigon by November 20. After his departure, the number of non-Communist reporters in South Vietnam will be reduced to 4—from Agence France-Press, the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Japan Broadcasting Corporation, and Kyodo.

Oct. 25—The government permits the 1,546 Vietnamese refugees en route from Guam to reenter the country "this time only."

Oct. 30—In Moscow, North Vietnamese and Soviet officials sign an agreement providing Soviet credit on easy terms for reconstruction in North Vietnam.

YUGOSLAVIA

(See *Italy*)

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use of the former American base at Camranh Bay in Vietnam. Significantly, Indonesia (which has not yet resumed normal relations with the People's Republic of China) has revived and strengthened her relations with the Soviet Union during the past year. In addition, there has been a proliferation of exchanges between Indonesia and North Korea, and Indonesia has made repeated overtures to a number of East European countries.³² Although the professed aim of these projects (and the Foreign Ministry appeared to be somewhat apologetic about them) was to establish close relations in matters of trade in the new climate of détente, Indonesia may be trying to accommodate herself to the other new order in Southeast Asia. ■

³² In world travel Adam Malik would seem to emulate United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. His frequent exploits abroad are faithfully recorded by the *INaV*. See the issues of June 22, 1974, August 12, 1974, December 2, 1974, February 15, 1975, April 12, 1975, March 15, 1975 and July 29, 1975.



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